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ABSTRACT 
 While the utilization of electricity to support human needs is a staple of modern 
society, the organizations and legal frameworks underlying the generation, transmission, 
and distribution of electricity differ across world regions. In the United States, diverse 
public and private entities are enmeshed throughout the power grid and work to maintain 
electrical security, i.e., a stable and continuous supply of electricity to customers in the 
presence of threats. This cooperative relationship appears to be effective given legacy 
systems and economic structures. However, the incorporation of renewable energy 
technologies presents a challenge given new system complexity, economic structures, and 
organizational relationships they create. This thesis assesses the existing organizational 
structures and relationships that form between public and private electric power entities 
in the United States and their efficacy for ensuring electrical security given high 
penetration of renewable energy. Despite gaps in the partnership structure and a lack of 
renewable energy inclusion in federal electrical security policy, this thesis suggests that 
renewable energy security can be achieved with existing partnership structures. Future 
partnerships must continue to leverage information sharing, funding, and reform from 
lessons learned to successfully navigate future security challenges. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The utilization of electric power is a staple of American society. It is utilized to 
light our homes and businesses, cook our meals, and fosters our access to avenues of 
entertainment and socialization. Maintaining the security of the electric system is not a new 
need. Due to their pervasive nature, power systems have always been vulnerable to 
disasters and a common target for malicious attacks, both of which can disrupt the flow of 
electricity and adversely impact communities. Given these threats, public and private 
entities have been working to maintain the stable and continuous supply of electricity to 
customers across the nation for years. This cooperative relationship appears to be effective 
as the United States has not experienced widespread catastrophic failures in the electric 
system from security failures. However, the incorporation of renewable energy 
technologies presents an additional layer of complexity within an already challenging 
problem set. New challenges and intricate complexities will lead this research to explore, 
what are the roles of public and private entities in securing renewable energy 
infrastructure? 
The research question has several layers that are worth unpacking. First, it is widely 
acknowledged by the U.S. government and electric power industry that energy security and 
resilience efforts are a shared responsibility between private industry and government.1 
This prompts questions such as is that partnership effectively managed; does each party 
adequately contribute; and what is the role of each entity? These are important questions 
as government and industry have opposing interests that intersect at the crossroads of 
energy security. Answering these questions requires research into the intersection of 
electrical security and renewable energy. 
Electrical security is a broad concept dealing with managing threats to ensure stable 
and continuous delivery of electricity to U.S. customers. Analysis conducted by the 
 
1 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, “Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2015,” 
2015, vii. 
2 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE), include 
cyber and physical security threats; extreme weather conditions and natural disasters; 
capability reduction within the workforce; aging infrastructure; and changes in the 
technical and operational environment as the most substantial risks to the energy sector.2 
Each of these threats is distinctly diverse in its origination as well as the response required 
to prevent its negative effects upon the United States electrical system. However, the 
greater concern is the fallout from a major disruption of the nation’s power supply. Such 
an event would affect every critical infrastructure sector and the nation’s economy. 
Renewable energy encompasses many technologies meant to reduce the use of 
fossil fuels for electricity production. Historically, the U.S. has relied on fossil fuels like 
coal, oil, and natural gas for the majority of its power generation. Two key renewable 
energy technologies disrupting existing systems are wind turbines and solar photovoltaics 
(i.e., solar panels). However, other new technologies like solar thermal, wave energy, and 
geothermal power, alongside legacy technologies considered renewable like nuclear and 
hydroelectric power are also disrupting existing systems. Moreover, there are many power 
system technologies that enable renewables and lead to new transmission and distribution 
systems, such as smart grid and control systems that enable household energy production. 
Overall, renewable energy introduces many novel built and organizational structures to the 
existing grid that bring new security challenges. 
The rapid growth and implementation of renewable energy initiatives further 
emphasizes a need to understand if existing electric security practices work with renewable 
energy. The effects of climate change and rising carbon emissions are facilitating 
persuasive calls for the United States to become increasingly dependent on renewable 
energy sources. However, there is no standard approach to implementing renewable 
energy, and there are diverse methods and different business structures utilized in different 
U.S. regions for energy supply. The implementation of renewable energy within the United 
States remains in its infancy. Therefore, the research and examination of these issues are 
timely as the nation prepares for dramatic shifts within our electrical infrastructure.  
 
2 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, 5. 
3 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In the research surrounding this topic there are varying levels of analytical depth 
and perspective. This literature review will explore three areas of the topic: critical 
infrastructure in U.S. government policy, threats to critical electrical infrastructure, and 
securing infrastructure through public-private partnership.  
1. Critical Infrastructure in U.S. Government Policy Documents  
The USA PATRIOT Act provided the current definition of critical infrastructure 
used by the United States. It describes critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction 
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”3 
The first high-level policy guidance on critical infrastructure in the modern era was 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in 1998.4 PDD-63 recognized that various 
infrastructure systems were becoming increasingly critical to the operation of the economy 
and the U.S. government, it acknowledged the growing interdependence of these systems 
due to technological advances, and it underlined the importance of a public-private 
partnership to facilitate cooperation on these issue.5  
Although there is acknowledgement of critical infrastructure in the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the next major policy push did not occur until 2013, with Presidential Policy Directive 
21 (PDD-21), Executive Order 13636, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP).6 These documents outlined sixteen critical infrastructure sectors that continue to 
be utilized for understanding and organizing security of our nation’s infrastructure. One of 
these sectors is the energy sector. They also provide a definition of critical infrastructure 
 
3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56 (2001). 
4 Brian E. Humphreys, Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for 
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2019), 1. 
5 William Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection, PDD-63 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 1998). 
6 Humphreys, Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress, 2–3. 
4 
resilience that underpins all federal policy on electrical security. Here, resilience is defined 
as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover 
rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from 
deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.”7 
Government and private entities of the energy sector worked collectively to produce 
the sector specific plan in 2015. On the government side, these included the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Government 
Coordinating Council (GCC), and, the private side, the Electricity Subsector Coordinating 
Council (ESCC). The GCC and the ESCC are commonly referred to as partnership 
councils. Each critical infrastructure sector was mandated to produce a sector specific 
security plan such in the 2013 NIPP. The Energy Sector-Specific Plan attempts to outline 
energy sector partnerships, goals, and priorities.8 Although the cooperation to produce such 
a plan is positive, the document itself is merely a strategy. It is not representative of the 
action necessary by the respective actors to increase security of electrical assets.  
This review emphasizes that critical infrastructure has become increasingly 
important to the federal government since the 1990s, yet legislation and policy efforts are 
far from complete. Research suggests that there are several areas that future critical 
infrastructure legislation should focus on. These focus areas include information sharing 
and regulation.9 Information sharing is primarily complicated by the number and variety 
of entities involved. Within the public sphere there are federal, state, and local governments 
and agencies. This includes the intelligence agencies that are collecting and reproducing 
information for security purposes. There is also information sharing within the private 
sector and between the public and private entities. Analysis of the methods and processes 
of information sharing may provide further insight into the effectiveness of the current 
public-private partnerships.  
 
7 Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 
PPD-21 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
8 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, “Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2015.” 
9 John D. Moteff, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation, CRS Report No. 
RL30153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 27. 
5 
2. Identifying and Managing Threats to America’s Electrical System 
Threats to the country’s electric system are a prominent topic of U.S. government 
documents and scholarly literature. The PATRIOT ACT recognized that terrorist 
organizations may target our infrastructure because of the potential damage an attack 
would likely cause.10 PDD-63 recognized the vulnerability of a cyber attack.11 The Energy 
Sector Specific Plan asserts that the key threats are physical attacks, cyber attacks, natural 
disasters, aging infrastructure, and workforce capability.12 Each of these examples present 
a viable threat to American electrical security. 
Physical attacks are arguably the easiest threat to conceptualize. A malicious actor 
desires to destroy physical infrastructure equipment or assets that will harm American 
interests. The introduction of smart grid and microgrid technologies, while much more 
efficient, present an increase of vulnerable cyber access points to the electric grid.13 
Natural disasters and weather events have always been a vulnerability to energy assets. 
Their unpredictable forces hold the potential to disrupt power systems by damaging or 
destroying equipment. Moreover, the impacts of climate change are increasing the damage 
and frequency of disruption within energy systems. The age of our electrical infrastructure 
is another vulnerability of our electrical system. The majority of transmission and 
distribution lines in the U.S. have surpassed their recommended fifty-year life expectancy. 
Additionally, many power lines were not designed to sustain the current levels of electric 
demand.14 Similar to electric infrastructure equipment, the base of electric utility workers 
has become aged. Some estimates state that more than half of these workers will be eligible 
 
10 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. 
11 Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
12 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, “Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2015,” 
5. 
13 Thomas F. McLarty et al., Securing the U.S. Electrical Grid: Understanding the Threats to the Most 
Critical of Critical Infrastructure, While Securing a Changing Grid (Washington, DC: Center for the Study 
of the Presidency & Congress, 2014), 5. 
14 American Society of Civil Engineers, Infrastructure Report Card: Energy (Reston, VA: American 
Society of Civil Engineers, 2017). 
6 
for retirement within the next several years.15 This could produce massive gaps in the work 
forces capability and knowledge.  
Although they have not had devasting effects, physical attacks against the electric 
grid have occurred within the past decade.16 These incidents provide an opportunity for 
further analysis due to their respective differences in location, means, actor, and motive. 
The reality of physical attacks upon infrastructure is addressed in various literature. 
Scholarly work analyzing physical attacks stress the importance of optimization and system 
redundancies.17 Other research displays which physical attack mitigation methods are most 
effective.18 By understanding where attacks can cause optimal damage and what methods 
best defend assets, electrical entities can more accurately implement defensive security 
measures. 
The current understanding of primary threats to the electric grid remain applicable 
in the context of renewable energy. However, the implementation of renewable energy 
technology will create increased diversity in energy production. This will apply to the 
technological methods employed for generation and number of private companies 
managing those assets. Scholars suggest that more diversity of technologies brought by 
renewable energy will make it more difficult to balance the supply and demand needs of 
the electric grid.19 Although renewable energy is largely considered a domestic energy 
effort without import reliance, some European nations have explored the importation of 
solar energy from North Africa.20 No literature suggests that the United States would have 
to explore similar transnational import efforts. However, based on the United States various 
uses of renewable energy and expansive geographic footprint, it is possible that energy 
 
15 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy, “Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2015,” 
18. 
16 McLarty et al., Securing the U.S. Electrical Grid, 2014. 
17 Gerald Brown et al., “Defending Critical Infrastructure,” Interfaces 36, no. 6 (December 2006): 530–
44. 
18 Jenna K. McGrath, “Will Updated Electricity Infrastructure Security Protect the Grid? A Case Study 
Modeling Electrical Substation Attacks,” Infrastructures 3, no. 53 (November 20, 2018): 1–17. 
19 Bengt Johansson, “Security Aspects of Future Renewable Energy Systems-A Short Overview,” 
Energy 61 (2013): 598–605. 
20 Johansson, 600. 
7 
transportation or transmission of renewable energy may occur between our current energy 
regions.21 The facilitation of such efforts creates another credible risk to the security of 
renewable energy initiatives within the United States. Additionally, consideration must be 
given to electric assets being imported. This raises the possibility of device-level attacks, 
such as built-in backdoors to access control equipment. 
3. Securing Infrastructure through Public-Private Cooperation  
Policy documents, reports, and scholarly works state that infrastructure security is 
a cooperative effort between government and the private sector. However, the 
responsibilities within the relationship are vague. Although the federal government has 
established means to foster cooperation such as partnership councils and bureaucratic 
agencies that oversee security efforts, it is often difficult to judge their respective 
effectiveness. In order to understand the literature of public-private cooperation, I will 
address what has been written in the context of energy partnerships.  
There are countless public-private partnerships that exist between private electric 
companies and various levels of government. The point of these partnerships is to facilitate 
cooperation that will bolster electrical security. The manner in which these partnerships do 
so varies tremendously. This thesis will focus largely on the federal government as the 
public participant and the effectiveness of information sharing, funding, and reform-based 
partnerships.  
Scholarly work addressing public-private partnerships and renewable energy 
appears to target community level government as the primary public entity of interest. 
Some scholars recognize that national government has a role to play, but that it is “often 
unable or unwilling to address some challenges on their own.”22 This inaction by the 
federal government increases that importance of local government in the problem set. 
Additionally, it aligns with the theory that the introduction of renewable energy assets will 
 
21 U.S. Department of Energy: Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, Climate Change and the 
U.S. Energy Sector: Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions (U.S. Department of Energy: Office 
of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, 2015). 
22 Avri Eitan et al., “Community-Private Sector Partnerships in Renewable Energy,” Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 105 (2019): 95–104. 
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allow much greater decentralization of our electrical infrastructure.23 However, other 
scholars argue that this approach is too dismissive of the federal government. Renewable 
energy projects experience an entanglement of unavoidable relationships across local, 
regional, and national divides. Furthermore, it is necessary to have an appropriate 
combination of top-down policy and bottom-up initiatives to facilitate any large-scale 
reconfiguration such as renewable energy.24 Although these works are not written 
explicitly in the context of security, analysis of the relationships discussed remains 
applicable to the research question.  
The U.S. federal government is expending tremendous effort on countering the 
threat of cyber attacks. The cyber threat is unique in its expanse across numerous 
infrastructure sectors. Yet, the implementation of smart grid technology and other 
advancements have increased the relevance of cyber security and its necessary partnerships 
within the energy sector. Enacted simultaneously with PDD-21 Executive Order 13636 
was implemented to reduce cyber vulnerabilities within all U.S. critical infrastructure 
systems.25 This was followed in 2018 by legislation that created the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).26 CISA seeks to lead the national effort to defend 
against cyber attacks. The establishment of CISA demonstrates the commitment that the 
federal government is directing towards cyber security. Although there does not appear to 
be a comparable document specifically addressing cyber threats within the electrical sector, 
Executive Order 13920 seeks to address vulnerabilities of acquiring electrical power assets 
from foreign entities. The order prevents acquisition of any bulk-power system electric 
 
23 Eitan et al., 95. 
24 Emily Creamer et al., “Community Energy: Entanglements of Community, State, and Private 
Sector,” Geography Compass 12, no. 7 (May 2018): 8–9. 
25 Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2013), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-
infrastructure-cybersecurity. 
26 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–278 (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3359. 
9 
equipment from any foreign country.27 Written and issued with broad scope, it includes 
the acquisition of cyber components and software.  
However, the establishment of a new bureaucratic agency is unlikely to relieve 
infrastructure managers of their cyber related woes. Scholars have argued that the flaw in 
our cyber approach lies within the operation and reliance on public-private partnerships. 
They argue that the parameters of partnerships are ambiguous. Public and private entities 
have both been hesitant to exercise authority or responsibility over cyber security.28 
Although this argument is presented in the context of cyber security, it is indicative of the 
other relationships across the public-private divide of the energy sector. Furthermore, it is 
troublesome as it presents a major national security concern. 
Overall, there appears to be a lack of scholarly material that directly analyzes the 
work of energy partnership councils. As a primary avenue for cooperation between federal 
government representatives and the private sector, this structure requires more scholarly 
analysis. Additionally, membership of the electricity subsector coordinating council does 
not appear to include members who represent renewable energy companies or renewable 
energy technology producers.29 Although renewable energy assets are in the early stages 
of implementation, this may be indicative of a lack of inclusion for renewable energy 
managers and operators in partnership efforts.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
After initial review of the literature surrounding this research question, it is clear 
that public and private entities both have a role to play in securing renewable energy 
infrastructure. However, it is less clear what that role explicitly is for each entity. In this 
 
27 Executive Order 13920: Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (2020), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-
system/. 
28 Madeline Carr, “Public-Private Partnerships in National Cyber-Security Strategies,” International 
Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 43–62. 





thesis, I make two interrelated arguments about public-private relationships in the 
electricity sector. First, the current structure of public-private governance has created gaps 
in the United States’ energy security. Second, the public private partnership model has 
failed to account for the inclusion of renewable energy in electrical security policy and 
priorities.  
The current public-private governance structure should not be viewed as a failure. 
Rather it should be viewed as a structural foundation that has cracks. Although the structure 
currently remains intact, time and stress could potentially cause this foundation to crumble. 
There are three cracks in the public-private partnership that create gaps in security. First, 
the current partnership focuses too much on coordination and collaboration, and not enough 
on defining responsibility. Although coordination is a vital part of this partnership, there 
must be an explicit understanding of responsibilities within the relationship. Second, the 
current partnership structure is voluntary for private entities. This voluntary mindset is 
applicable to private sector participation and implementation of many security practices. 
For example, the NIPP repeatedly uses the term “encourage” to describe how the federal 
government seeks to persuade private entities.30 This language is commonly used within 
and among many government and private security plans. The federal government must 
acknowledge that encouragement does not produce the same results as mandates. Third, 
the current partnership is operated across a plethora of agencies, councils, regions, and 
organizations. It would be ignorant to believe that an issue as complicated and important 
as electrical security does not require a vast amount of participation. However, it is possible 
that efforts conducted across such a wide range of entities enable confusion and 
inefficiency. Further consolidation of organizations, information sharing avenues, and 
collaborative efforts may be beneficial to security. 
In order to assign responsibility for security threats, there must be an accepted 
understanding of electrical security. This research views electrical security as the effort to 
maintain stable electrical delivery to U.S. customers without disruption. However, critical 
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infrastructure policy acknowledges that a zero-defect mentality is unrealistic. PPD-21 
states that resilience efforts allow the U.S. to “recover rapidly from disruptions.”31 Security 
and resilience efforts operate in tandem. Striving to prevent any disruption, while unlikely, 
is arguably the necessary mindset for electrical security professionals.  
Assignment of responsibility does not negate the necessity for collaboration and 
coordination. Rather it seeks to define who maintains authority over the situation and drives 
the problem towards solution. This thesis argues that appropriate assignment of 
responsibility depends on the type of threat that the electricity sector is facing. Specifically, 
the federal government should exercise authority over any threat that can be labeled an 
“attack.” The primary examples are physical and cyber attacks. In contrast, threats created 
by natural disasters and aging infrastructure should be managed by utility owners: usually 
private entities or local government. Finally, workforce vulnerabilities should remain under 
the explicit authority of the respective private entity.  
Although this thesis assigns primary governmental responsibility for managing 
many traditional electrical security threats to the federal government, It argues that state 
and local governments will acquire increased levels of responsibility within the security 
strategy as a result of the implementation of renewable energy initiatives. Renewable 
energy and technology advancements, such as microgrids and smart grids, will drive a more 
localized approach to electricity generation.  
Critics of these perspectives may argue that the current public-private governance 
structure is adequate to manage existing and renewable energy related emerging threats to 
the electricity sector. These critics may also argue that changes to the governance structure 
may place undue demand on energy businesses seeking to gain a profit. This thesis will 
provide evidence that challenges their perspective.  
In addition to structural gaps, public and private actors have fallen short of 
adequately accounting for the inclusion of renewable energy assets in electrical security 
policy and partnership efforts. Both sides of the partnership are overly reliant on legacy 
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policies and efforts to address renewable energy security. It appears that this is likely 
because public and private entities are more concerned with the implementation and 
operation of renewable energy assets rather than their explicit security.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Due to the early stage of renewable energy within the United States, there is 
minimal research that directly addresses the security of renewable energy initiatives. 
Therefore, this research must address several related topics that influence the 
understanding of the research question. This includes critical infrastructure policy, the 
current public-private governance strategy employed for the electric sector, threats to the 
electric system, and the implementation and impact of renewable energy to the U.S. electric 
system. Analysis of these topics will allow a diagnosis of any issues regarding their 
facilitation. To conduct this diagnosis, the research will incorporate analysis of policy 
documents, think tank reports, case studies, and scholarly journal articles.  
The first portion of this research will explore the prominent threats on the current 
U.S. electric system. This section will rely heavily on the Energy Sector Specific Plan and 
think tank reports that address these diverse threats. Additionally, I will provide historical 
examples of disruptions to the American power grid. These examples are not meant to 
facilitate lengthy case study analysis., but rather to display their relevance and influence 
on our understanding of electrical security. 
The second portion of the research will explore public-private governance in the 
electric sector. Critical infrastructure security, to include electricity, has developed over 
the past three decades due to several major policy initiatives. These initiatives laid the 
foundation for how public and private entities interact within the electric sector. It is easy 
to assume that our current management strategy is effective because the United States has 
not experienced a complete failure of the electric system. The most devastating events have 
largely been limited to certain regions over several days. Analysis of these policies and the 
governance structure they created will seek to diagnose any gaps or weaknesses in security 
coverage. 
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The third portion of this research will compare conventional electrical security 
threats with those anticipated with renewable energy. Additionally, this portion will review 
the applicability of previously reviewed federal policies to the implementation of 
renewable energy. By analyzing aspects of the current system and what the future system 
will entail, I will be able to ascertain improvements that public-private partnerships should 
embrace to secure renewable energy infrastructure. This result will serve as the culmination 
of this research. 
There is a lack of scholarly literature for some aspects of this research. For example, 
there does not appear to be significant scholarly analysis of the electrical sector partnership 
councils. However, this literature gap can be overcome through analysis of sources that 
discuss other aspects of partnership or operation of the electric energy sector. Additionally, 
even though there does not appear to be much literature explicitly pertaining to the security 
of renewable energy, there appears to be significant analysis of the implementation of 
renewable energy.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will include five chapters. Chapter I will serve as an introduction to the 
research question, literature review, and argument. Chapter II will explore the primary 
threats to the electrical sector. Chapter III will discuss the public-private partnership that 
facilitates security, operation, and regulation of the current electric sector. Chapter IV will 
introduce renewable energy considerations to the research and assess how findings in 
Chapters II and III will impact renewable energy security. Chapter V will serve as a 
conclusion to synthesize the findings within this research and provide recommendations to 
improve public-private partnerships for the inclusion of renewable energy assets. 
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II. ELECTRICITY THREATS 
This chapter will explore the prominent vulnerabilities of the United States electric 
system. First, this chapter will provide some basic background knowledge of the electric 
system and the definition of electrical security utilized during this research. Second, it will 
provide a brief account of two events that can be considered electrical security failures: the 
2003 Northeast Blackout and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. The brief descriptions of these 
events are intended to demonstrate the scope of damage that can occur during large scale 
electric outages. Third, this chapter will discuss the five most prominent vulnerabilities to 
the electric system as recognized by the 2015 Energy Sector-Specific Plan.  
A. ELECTRICAL SYSTEM BASICS 
The U.S. electric system is operated through a vast network of equipment and 
organizations. The organizational structure will be further explored in chapter three of this 
thesis. To understand the vulnerabilities faced by the system, one must have a basic 
understanding of the equipment and functions within the electrical system. The electric 
power system is formed by three major functions: generation, transmission, and 
distribution. Each of these concepts are simple, but they are vital to the production and 
supply of electrical power.  
Electrical generation is performed at a variety of power plant facilities. These 
facilities differ and are characterized by the energy source that they utilize to generate 
electricity. Generation plants may use turbines to convert the combustion of fossil fuels 
such as natural gas or coal into electric power. Additionally, renewable energy technology 
such as hydroelectric dams, nuclear power, solar panels, and wind turbines serve as 
generation sources across the country.32  
Following generation, the movement of electricity within the system is controlled 
by transmission assets. Electric power transmission in the U.S. is largely completed using 
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alternating current. First, the voltage of generated electricity is increased by a transformer 
placed between the generation plant and the transmission lines. The utilization of high 
voltage is necessary because as the electricity is transmitted through the system, resistance 
will cause portions of the electricity to dissipate as heat. Many generation facilities are not 
in close proximity to customers. Transmission lines are typically implemented as overhead 
power lines or underground cables. The transmission portion of the system is the strongest 
point of redundancy within the electrical system. Transmission lines are interconnected so 
that reliability is increased across the country.33 
The final function is distribution. Distribution networks facilitate the final stage of 
electrical delivery to homes or businesses via localized distribution networks. As electricity 
transitions from transmission to distribution, another transformer will reduce the voltage 
to an appropriate amount. Distribution networks are constructed of wiring that transports 
electricity to consumers. Once electricity reaches the consumer it can be utilized for a 
variety of activities and functions.34 Figure 1 illustrates these processes of the electric 
power system. 
 
Figure 1. Electrical System Basics35 
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the Study of the Presidency & Congress, July 2014), 7. 
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B. ELECTRICITY AND ENERGY SECURITY 
As one of the most prominent forms of energy, electricity and its security initiatives 
can be viewed as a direct subset of energy security. Therefore, the definition of electrical 
security and associated concepts should reflect this link. The definition of energy security 
has been debated by scholars without receiving a consensus to its terminology. The 
definition formulated by Jewell et al. defines energy security as ‘low vulnerability of vital 
energy systems.’36 Use of the term electrical security in this research reflects the use of 
this definition with the specific referral to electrical systems. This analysis favors this 
definition because it allows a level of flexibility and realism.  
In addition to flexibility, this definition provides a practical goal for power systems 
as ‘low vulnerability’. While utilities should strive to provide completely uninterrupted 
electrical services, the reality is some level of power disruptions on electric grids will 
continue. That being said, the critical nodes and system components of vital energy systems 
must remain protected, resilient, and incorporate redundancies.  
Understanding electrical security is important because of the criticality of the 
electric grid on American society. The electric sector serves as the backbone to all other 
critical infrastructure sectors. This is not to say that the electric sector does not maintain a 
level of dependence on other sectors to support operations, but that the inherent dependence 
of other services on electricity increases the importance of uninterrupted operations. A 
failure of the electric system can quickly result in reduced operation or failure of other 
systems and sectors.  
C. ELECTRICAL SECURITY FAILURES 
Prolonged and large-scale losses of electricity are rare in the United States. Two 
specific instances underline the importance of electrical security efforts: the 2003 Northeast 
blackout and the loss of Puerto Rico’s power system due to Hurricane Maria. These 
examples reflect the vulnerabilities that impact the electrical system. However, they are 
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important because they provide a snapshot of the impacts from a loss of the electric system 
to other threats  
In August 2003, a series of cascading system failures resulted in an electrical 
blackout that affected customers across the Northeast, Midwest, and parts of Canada. 
Approximately 50 million Americans were affected by the blackout.37 The initial failure 
was caused by a 345-kV transmission line contacting an overgrown tree. This shifted the 
electrical load to other transmission lines, but they became overstressed and began to cause 
power surges at power plants and major interconnections. Electrical failures were 
experienced in more than 256 power plants and several major cities including New York 
City, Detroit, Cleveland, Hartford, and Albany. Some areas did not have power restored 
for four days after the failure occurred.38 This example demonstrates the limitations of the 
nations outdated electrical infrastructure. Furthermore, it demonstrates the downside of 
over reliance on interoperability. The inability to isolate the outage resulted in its cascading 
effect resulting in millions without power.  
Some may criticize the inclusion of Puerto Rico in this analysis due to its lack of 
statehood. I believe that despite the complicated relationship between the U.S. government 
and the territory of Puerto Rico the analysis conducted remains indicative of many issues 
plaguing the electrical system of the U.S. mainland. In September 2017, Hurricane Maria 
made landfall on Puerto Rico as a category 4 hurricane (The storm was only 1 mph less 
than the windspeed required to be classified as a category 5). The hurricane caused flooding 
at several power plants, damage to wind turbines, and severe damage to transmission and 
distribution lines across the island. The damage to the system resulted in many customers 
remaining without power for more than ten months.39  
The prolonged outages on Puerto Rico can be attributed to more than the strength 
of Hurricane Maria. The hurricane was merely a catalyst for exposing many underlying 
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issues within the island’s electric infrastructure. For example, only 15% of transmission 
lines were constructed or implemented to the necessary specifications allowing them to 
endure the forces of a category 4 hurricane.40 As a frequent victim of major hurricanes, it 
is startling that the Puerto Rican electric sector and governmental leadership would allow 
themselves to remain susceptible to a threat that is overwhelmingly probable. These types 
of operational and management decisions over decades resulted in a lowered level of 
resilience for Puerto Rico’s electrical system leading up to Hurricane Maria. 
The brief description of these two events barely scratches the surface of explaining 
what happened during these outages. Their inclusion is intended to demonstrate the fallout 
of major electrical outages that have occurred within U.S. jurisdictions. The concept of 50 
million Americans losing power is startling. Furthermore, the idea that American citizens 
could remain without power for more than ten months is arguably unbelievable. These 
types of large scale and prolonged outages can quickly inhibit public health, safety, 
security, telecommunication and economic interests. These two specific incidents can be 
primarily attributed to insufficient or outdated infrastructure baring the effects of natural 
weather occurrences. Although these issues remain major vulnerabilities to the electric 
grid, it is plausible that the vulnerability of a targeted attack could be even more damaging 
to the system and the nation.  
The next portion of this chapter will explore the most prominent risks to U.S. 
electrical security as outlined by government and industry officials alike in the 2015 Energy 
Sector-Specific Plan. Many of these risks have already damaged the grid to some degree 
in various cases. After outlining each risk, I will describe historical examples of how these 
risks have caused negative effects on the electrical system or been exploited by adversaries.  
D. ELECTRICAL SECURITY THREATS 
1. Physical Attack 
More than any other vulnerability, physical attacks are the easiest to conceptualize 
within our understanding of electrical security. The American psyche has been forced to 
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believe since September 11 that terrorists using force against American interests are one of 
the biggest risks to our security and well-being. It is undeterminable whether this statement 
is true. However, physical attacks against the electrical system by nefarious actors remain 
a plausible threat.  
Electricity networks are complex systems that cover vast geographic areas via 
various physical equipment. Furthermore, portions of the systems frequently operate within 
and serve multiple governmental jurisdictions. For example, transmission lines often cross 
multiple state boundaries or utilities may support multiple counties within a region, without 
the county in its entirety being covered by the same utility.  
Physical attacks may include targeting generation facilities, transformers, 
transmission lines or other system components. Destruction of any physical components 
within the system will result in some level of disruption of redundancy within the system. 
The large geographic footprint of the system makes security efforts across the entirety of 
the system difficult. The manpower required to provide surveillance across the miles of 
system equipment is unrealistic. Therefore, security efforts and personnel are primarily 
concentrated at nodes within the system.  
These vital nodes include equipment such as Large Power Transformers (LPTs) 
that frequently facilitate the increase and decrease of voltage across the grid. LPTs allow 
for the necessary change in voltage as electricity travels through the system. The loss of an 
LPT could potentially result in large electrical disruptions downstream in the system. To 
further complicate the issue, the U.S. has strongly relied on overseas manufacturers to 
supply LPTs. The complexity of the LPT procurement process frequently causes these 
overseas manufacturers to take more than a year to provide replacements.41 There are some 
cases which the time to replace an LPT has been more than twenty months.42 This has 
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resulted in efforts to stockpile replacement transformers. However, experts have in turn 
raised concern about the security of storage facilities that maintain this stockpiled 
equipment.43 
There are two prominent examples of physical attacks occurring against U.S. 
electrical system assets: the Metcalf substation attack and a series of attacks on Entergy 
facilities in Arkansas. Physical attacks can occur through a variety of means and actors. 
These two examples provide a diverse sampling of both those factors.  
In the first example, in 2013 a group of individuals attacked the Metcalf Substation 
in San Jose, California. Prior to the attack, the attackers severed the fiber-optic phone lines 
at the facility. This disrupted communication services with customers and made it more 
difficult for on-site personnel to notify emergency services. The attackers proceeded to use 
assault rifles to fire at transformers from outside a chain-link fence.44 The bullet holes 
caused thousands of gallons of oil to leak from the transformers. As the transformers lost 
oil, they began to overheat resulting in a total of 17 transformers being disabled. Due to the 
attack occurring during a period of low demand, utility workers were able to reroute power 
and prevent a blackout.45 Unfortunately, the substation was unable to return to normal 
operation for 27 days as the transformers were repaired and replaced as necessary. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been unable to determine who was responsible 
for the attack.46 
The second notable example is a series of three physical attacks that occurred in 
Lonoke County, Arkansas against Entergy Arkansas assets. Interestingly, these attacks 
occurred within several months of the Metcalf Substation attack. During the first attack, 
the perpetrator forcefully entered an area securing a 500 kV electrical line, then removed 
nearly all of the bolts from the line’s support tower. The tower proceeded to fall on a nearby 
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railroad track where multiple power lines later became severed by a transiting train. The 
severed lines caused the town of Cabot, Arkansas to lose power. A second attack occurred 
about a month later at an Entergy station when a fire was intentionally set resulting in 
approximately $2 million in damages. In the final attack, the perpetrator damaged a power 
pole and proceeded to pull it down with a tractor. The attack caused damage to a 115 kV 
transmission line and resulted in electrical outages for more than 9,000 customers. The FBI 
arrested a lone actor, Jason Woodring, for the attacks. The authorities determined that 
Woodring did not have ties with a larger terrorist organization.47 
There are several differences between the attacks, which display the varying 
methods that could be used for physical attacks. The Metcalf incident was carried out by a 
group utilizing small arms against a manned facility. The specificity of targeting the 
transformer oil tanks and the foresight to remove emergency communication methods 
suggests a high level of planning a sophistication for the attack. In contrast, the series of 
attacks in Arkansas were carried out by a lone actor utilizing multiple methods against 
various unmanned electrical system components. While the perpetrator certainly planned 
to some degree, it is clear that his goals were focused much more on ease of access.  
2. Cyber Attack 
The threat of cyber attacks has grown within the energy sector and more broadly 
with U.S. interests. One can even argue that the modern political push for protection of 
critical infrastructure is as much based in the protection of cyber systems as it is physical 
structures Presidential Decision Directive 63, released in 1998, clearly discusses how 
American interests are increasingly reliant upon cyber-based information systems.48 Time 
and further technological advances have made this assertion even more of a reality.  
There are several reasons why cyber attacks are of such great concern. The field of 
cyber security is constantly evolving. As officials rapidly work to implement protections, 
new vulnerabilities are created and discovered just as quickly. Additionally, the nature of 
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the cyber threat allows nefarious actors to be located anywhere around the globe. The risk 
of being physically present to commit an attack is removed from the equation.  
Although there is evidence of malware intrusions by sophisticated adversaries, the 
United States has yet to experience a significant cyber attack against the electric grid.49 
However, cyber attacks against the Ukrainian electric grid and cyber intrusions into 
American water facilities offer comparable case studies for what future attacks will likely 
target.  
In December 2015, hackers began to target the control systems of the Ukrainian 
power grid in the Ivano-Frankivsk region. The attack was coordinated against the systems 
at three different distribution centers. By remotely opening dozens of circuit breakers, 
numerous substations were taken offline and more than 230,000 residents were left without 
power to endure the winter temperatures. Workers at the distribution centers were helpless 
to stop the attack even as they noticed the perpetrators controlling the computer cursor. 
Furthermore, operators at two of the distribution centers were without power because the 
hackers disabled the backup power supplies.50       
Officials involved in the investigation of the attack suggest that the operation took 
place over several months as the hackers studied the network setup based on 
reconnaissance efforts and gradually gained access to operator credentials. Due to political 
tensions, Ukraine attributes the attack to Russia. However, investigators suggest that 
multiple actors collaborated to conduct the attack. It is possible that a team of 
cybercriminals gained access to the network prior to transitioning the rest of operation to 
nation-state actors.51   
The method of the attack against the Florida water facility is extremely similar to 
the attack in Ukraine. They both began when an operator noticed the systems computer 
cursor began to take distinct actions to alter the normal operation of the system. In the 
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Florida incident, the hacker increased the level of sodium hydroxide in the water by a factor 
of 100. Fortunately, the local operator was able to correct the sodium hydroxide levels 
before it left the facility for distribution.52 
The Ukraine attack is the first confirmed attack to incapacitate an electrical grid.53 
This case presents itself as an example of the damage that an effective cyber attack can do. 
However, the damage could have been much worse. The circuit breakers that were altered 
by the hackers are designed to function manually as a backup. This functionality is the 
primary reason the Ukrainian grid was restored within several hours after the attack. 
Experts have directly commented that this type of backup operation is absent from many 
American grid control systems.54 This means that attempts to restore power following an 
attack would be prolonged and experience increased difficulty.  
The attack on the Florida water facility is notable two reasons. First, it occurred 
against an American facility. Second, the attack further demonstrates the possibility and 
probability of cyber vulnerabilities to exercise nefarious intentions. The fact that the 
American attack was against a water facility rather than an electrical facility does not make 
a significant difference. By briefly analyzing the Ukrainian and the Florida attack in 
parallel, the use of control systems in both instances should be a blinking red light for 
security specialists, operators, owners, and government officials alike. 
Of the electrical vulnerabilities this chapter will discuss, physical and cyber attacks 
are the only ones that are carried out by actors who intend to inflict harm upon United 
States interests. Whether they are committed by state, non-state, international, or domestic 
groups, or by lone actors, these types of attacks will have a direct human element involved. 
This means that there should be a reasonable expectation of sophistication and planning 
involved to exploit known and unknown weaknesses in our systems and operations.  
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It is possible that this sophistication could be applied to a coordinated attack that 
combines physical and cyber elements. Consider the Ukrainian example. If the manual 
backup circuit breaker switches or other vital equipment and structures were targeted while 
a cyber attack was occurring the damaging effects would certainly increase. It is almost 
assured that this type of attack would prolong electrical outages and disrupt response 
efforts.    
3. Natural Disasters and Weather 
Historically, weather events are the greatest threat to electric infrastructure.55 Their 
effects can range from minor disruptions in a single neighborhood due to a fallen tree on a 
distribution line to multi-state regions experiencing disruptions and outages due to severe 
snow and ice, wind and rain storms, or hurricanes. The inherent variety and variability of 
weather threats make them an incredibly difficult problem set. Additionally, climate 
change is exacerbating this issue by causing more frequent and severe episodes of extreme 
weather. These events commonly cause damage to equipment and facilities, large shifts in 
electricity supply and demand, and disruption of operations and supply chains.56 Earlier in 
this chapter, I briefly discussed that impact of Hurricane Maria. There is no shortage of 
weather and natural disaster examples that display the impact these events can have. The 
fact is that weather will continue to be a major vulnerability for maintaining electrical 
security.  
4. Aging Infrastructure 
The majority of the United States electric system was constructed in the 1950s and 
1960s, particularly transmission and distribution lines. This equipment has surpassed its 
designed 50-year life expectancy. Additionally, most transmission lines are operating at 
full capacity.57 The demands on aging infrastructure working at its operational limits are 
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colliding with the implementation of technological advances that are changing how the grid 
is operating. This includes the increased incorporation of renewable energy and the 
implementation of smart grid and microgrid technology.  
Regardless of how the grid is changing, ageing of electricity infrastructure increases 
the risk of disruption to customers. Most experts agree that the solution is continued 
monetary investment to maintain, update, and adapt the nations electric infrastructure as 
appropriate. However, the electric power industry already invests tens of billions of dollars 
each year for such initiatives.58 Organizations such as the American Society of Civil 
Engineers (ASCE) state that it is still not enough. The ASCE estimates there will be a 
$208 billion investment shortfall by 2029 to ensure a reliable electrical system.59 
Still, the implication of ageing infrastructure is difficult to quantify. When power 
outages occur, officials are unlikely to state that they were caused by a component that is 
outdated or beyond its intended operational life, they commonly communicate what 
component failed, but not why. This allows officials to acknowledge that they know what 
component broke without admitting an explanation that would foster bad publicity. 
Considering the general age of our systems, in combination with the known strain on the 
grid, it is reasonable to assume that aging infrastructure is at least a contributing factor in 
many outages. For example, in July 2019, approximately 39,000 customers lost power in 
the District of Columbia due to an issue at a single substation.60 During the outage, traffic 
lights and the Metro were impacted, restricting transportation. Numerous people became 
trapped in elevators, requiring the response of firefighters, and the capability to conduct 
business screeched to halt as shops had no means of completing electronic transactions.61 
Aging electrical infrastructure, specifically outdated substations, is one aspect being 
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addressed by the Capital Grid project. The project is ushering equipment upgrades at 
several substations across the District.62 Although the issue of aged infrastructure is 
known, until it is corrected it poses a risk of causes outages for customers.  
Occurrences such as this demonstrate two imperatives for our aging electric 
infrastructure. First, reliability issues must be acknowledged. Second, the concentration of 
electricity dependency within the system must be minimized. It is very problematic that 
39,000 people should be affected by a single equipment failure.  
5. Workforce Capability 
The Energy Sector Specific Plan recognizes that workforce development is a major 
vulnerability for the electrical sector. Specifically, the industry has experienced an 
increased gap in available skilled labor as older workers are retiring from the workforce.63 
As these older workers commence their retirements, years of knowledge and expertise is 
removed from the industry and these are not being adequately replenished.  
Electrical managers and the Department of Energy are working to address this issue 
via various training programs and recruitment methods.64 Additionally, President Biden 
has expressed that the U.S. transition to clean energy will seek to create more than 10 
million well-paying jobs.65 Time will tell whether industry and government initiatives will 
be able to close the labor gap within the electrical sector. If this issue is not addressed, 
customers are more likely to experienced prolonged outages.  
E. EFFORTS TO DEFEND AND REMAIN RESILIENT 
Each of these vulnerabilities presents a unique challenge. Furthermore, these 
vulnerabilities are not all-inclusive. These five areas discussed simply represent the areas 
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that industry and government officials agree are the most likely to create a negative impact 
on electrical security.  
In recent years, those involved in the critical infrastructure field have embraced the 
idea of resilience, to minimize some of these vulnerabilities. For example, Presidential 
Policy Directive-Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21) appears to be the 
first policy directive to address the concept of resilience. The document states, “critical 
infrastructure must be secure and able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards.”66 
This singular quote from PPD-21 addresses several aspects of resilience as addressed by 
scholars. Prominent scholars such as Woods have contended that there are four aspects of 
resilience that must be addressed concerning critical infrastructure such as the electrical 
system: resilience as rebound, resilience as robustness, resilience as extensibility, and 
resilience as adaptability.67 
First, resilience as rebound is the ability of a system to return to normal operation.68 
So, for the electrical system, this means how quickly outages and disruptions can be ended. 
Every outage is different, but there are several areas where officials can concentrate their 
efforts to increase resilience as rebound. Despite the cause, every outage is likely to require 
personnel and replacement equipment. With more trained workers available, they can 
quickly be dispatched to correct system damages. During severe weather, many utilities 
will do this by partnering with other companies in nearby locations and sharing repair 
crews as necessary. Regarding equipment, maintaining and managing stockpiles is vital. If 
necessary equipment is not on hand, repairs can be delayed by days or even weeks as items 
work their way through difficult supply chains. An inability to quickly make repairs 
directly hampers the system’s ability to rebound.  
Second, resilience as robustness is a system’s ability to absorb attempted 
perturbations and continue to operate without disruption.69 This concept is primarily 
 
66 Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
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enacted through the design phase of a system. For example, consider a network of above 
ground poles for power lines that are located in an area that frequently experiences severe 
winds during the annual hurricane season. Recognizing this, planners would benefit from 
installing poles that are specifically engineered to withstand high wind forces from severe 
hurricanes. On the surface this appears simple. However, it is likely that this type of power 
pole is more expensive to implement. Therefore, budget constraints or other competing 
interests may deter decision makers from installing the power poles that are more likely to 
endure weather conditions that the area will likely experience at some point in time. 
Third, resilience as extensibility refers to a system’s ability to maintain capacity in 
the event of a surprise event.70 Similar to resilience as robustness, extensibility is enacted 
within a system prior to a possible vulnerability being exploited. A system can enact 
extensibility by ensuring there are redundancies within the system. Redundancies ensure 
the system does not collapse due to a singular point of failure. The electrical system 
attempts to do this with transmission networks. Ideally, if a transmission line goes down, 
another portion of the system picks up the slack. Unfortunately, not every network has this 
redundancy or lines can become overloaded as they did during the 2003 Northeast 
Blackout.  
Fourth, resilience as adaptability is the ability to manage new system capacities 
following system disruptions.71 This concept is commonly experienced with the 
willingness to implement emerging technology to combat system disruptions. For example, 
the implementation of microgrid technology can enable portions of the grid to isolate and 
continue to operate even if a larger system is experiencing a disruption. Therefore, if a 
disruption happens to the system, the scope of its effects are limited. However, microgrids 
are a relatively new, expensive, and complicated system that need to be proven in more 
contexts before wider adoption is possible. Adaptability in the current power grid would 
be its capacity to incorporate microgrids despite these challenges. 
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F. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed the leading vulnerabilities to the U.S. electric system. It 
is clear that the vulnerabilities presented are extremely diverse. Attacks committed by 
physical or cyber actors present themselves as more traditional security concerns. In recent 
decades, Americans have accepted the fact that there are individuals, internationally and 
domestically, who want to negatively impact our interests. Severe weather will continue to 
be a major vulnerability for our electrical system. The inherent variability of the type, scale, 
and severity of storms and other weather conditions is a complicated challenge. 
Unfortunately, the effects of climate change appear to be increasing the damage inflicted 
during weather events. Although there is significant investment to address the nation’s aged 
electrical infrastructure, there is concern that it will fall short of what is required to maintain 
a reliable system. Finally, there are major concerns about the health of the workforce that 
operates, maintains, and manages our electrical infrastructure. If not corrected, this 
shortfall of expertise and experience may result in equipment damages, prolonged outages, 
and other negative impacts against electrical security. 
It is interesting that all these vulnerabilities have been recognized as the prominent 
vulnerabilities for several decades. As PDD-63 began the push to secure the nations critical 
infrastructure, each of these vulnerabilities was specifically mentioned.72  The discussion 
throughout this chapter provides evidence that several of these vulnerabilities have 
disrupted operation of the U.S. electric grid since their recognition. Overall, it appears that 
the U.S. has been able to minimize the frequency of large-scale electrical outages to few, 
salient events. However, that does not mean the current system cannot be improved to 
reduce its vulnerability given future operational and technological needs.  
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III. ELECTRICAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Electrical security partnership that exists between government and business are a 
collaborative effort. However, these entities have opposing interests and goals. 
Government is foundationally responsible for providing security and stability to its 
citizens. The purpose of business is to earn a profit. However, to be profitable, businesses 
must protect their assets. Within this dynamic there is plenty of gray area to describe where 
the responsibilities of each entity should begin and end with respect to electrical security. 
This analysis will explore whether the current electrical security public-private partnership 
structure has gaps that negatively impact security. 
This chapter will initially provide a foundational overview of common business 
models and regulatory structures in the U.S. electrical sector. Next, I will identify 
prominent government and private actors that contribute to securing the United States’ 
electric supply, as well as federal policy initiatives that have sought to enhance electrical 
security since the late 1990s. I will then discuss the current state of public-private 
partnerships by evaluating information sharing efforts, funding, and the ability to 
implement lessons learned. Finally, I offer that further consideration should be given to the 
complexity of electrical organizational structures and the dependence on private entities to 
voluntarily participate in security structures and implement security relevant guidance.  
A. BUSINESS MODELS AND REGULATORY STRUCTURES 
The core operations of the electric grid are creating and managing the supply of 
electricity to consumers. These systems include entities that are responsible for power 
generation, transmission, and distribution. There are numerous business models utilized 
within the American electrical grid, with varying authority structures. For example, one 
entity may control the entire electrical supply process, from generation to distribution. 
Alternatively, an entity may contribute to merely a single portion, such as the generation 
of electricity at a power plant. This section briefly explores some of the most prominent 
operational models, regulatory organizations, and transmission structures. Table 1 
summarizes these business models with a brief description.  
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Electric power that is supplied by private entities will typically be managed by a 
for-profit utility, owned by shareholders; these are frequently referred to as investor-owned 
utilities (IOUs). IOUs have service territories that are granted by licenses from their 
respective state commissions. It is also possible for these utilities to provide services in 
multiple states.73 IOUs tend to have some degree of vertical organization to supply power 
within an authorized geographic region. However, in an alternative operational model, 
private entities known as independent power producers contribute to electricity generation. 
These independent power producers generate electricity from their assets, then sell it to 
other utilities or directly to consumers.74  
Although the majority of electrical infrastructure is owned and operated by private 
entities, there are instances where federal, state or local government oversees grid 
operations.75 Federal power programs, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority or the 
Bonneville Power Administration, are wholesale power entities that provide electrical 
service functions to smaller-scale local utilities. These programs operate as government-
owned corporations that own generation and transmission facilities and carry out 
operations.76 In another government-controlled models, cities and counties can own not-
for-profit public power utilities. These are commonly referred to as municipals or munis. 
In addition to owning these utilities, the local governments regulate rather than federal or 
state authorities.77 An additional not-for-profit model utilized in the U.S. is cooperatives 
(Co-ops). Co-ops are owned by their members who elect representatives to oversee 
operations. Excess revenue is returned and distributed among Co-op members. This model 
is typically utilized in rural areas that are not served by other utilities.78 
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Table 1. Business Models in the U.S. Electrical Sector 
Business Model Description 
IOU (Investor-Owned Utility)  Private entity that is shareholder controlled. 
Profit oriented. 
IPP (Independent Power Producer) Private entity focused explicitly on electrical 
generation. 
Government Controlled Federal: Typically, government owned 
corporations with range of services (Ex: 
Tennessee Valley Authority). Supports smaller 
utilities in geographic region.  
Local: Typically, not-for-profit operation. 
Cooperative (Co-op) Owned by members. Managed by elected 
representatives. Common in rural areas. 
 
Utilities are the primary player involved in electrical operations. However, their 
operational environment is shaped by regulatory organizations. Just as there are federal, 
state, and local levels of ownership and operations, electrical regulation is conducted at 
various levels of scope and authority (see Table 2). The two federal-level organizations 
involved in regulation of the electrical grid are the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). FERC operates 
as an independent agency within the DOE to oversee the interstate transmission of 
electricity and other regulatory matters. FERC does not regulate retail electricity sales, 
activities of nuclear power plants, or approve construction of electrical generation assets.79 
In 2006, FERC designated NERC with the authority to regulate and oversee the electrical 
market to meet designated reliability standards. Some of NERC’s responsibilities include 
the development and enforcement of reliability standards; assessing long-term reliability; 
monitoring the bulk power system; and the education, training, and certification of 
electrical industry personnel.80 Due to the U.S. and Canada sharing large portions of the 
North American bulk power system, FERC and NERC have very close ties. 
 
79 Gilstrap, Amin, and DeCorla-Souza, 24. 
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State and local regulatory agencies and commissions also have a vital role to play 
in regulation and oversight of electrical assets. Although their scope of authority varies, 
lower-level regulation typically addresses issues such as facility inspections, electrical 
asset maintenance, and concerns such as vegetation management within service areas.81 
Additionally, commissions may regulate profits which in turn impacts utility budgets and 
planning capabilities.   
Table 2. Regulatory Organizations in the U.S. Electrical Sector 
Entity Focus 
FERC Independent agency within DOE. Large focus on regulation of 
electrical transmission. 
NERC Designated by FERC to regulate electrical reliability standards. 
State/Local Address concerns such as inspections, maintenance, and vegetation 
management of local assets. 
 
In addition to being shaped by business models and regulatory structures, U.S. 
electrical sector operations are dictated by the physical structure of the grid in different 
areas. In some areas, localized grid networks are connected to create larger networks that 
increase reliability and redundancy. The largest of these networks are referred to as 
interconnections. Interconnections have limited power transfers between them as they are 
meant to operate autonomously from one another. The electric grid of the continental 
United States has three interconnections: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western 
Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) that covers most 
of Texas.82 Figure 2 illustrates the boundaries of these three interconnections. 
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Figure 2. U.S. Electrical Power Interconnections83 
Within the Eastern and Western Interconnections there are several regionally 
associated markets that are managed by Independent System Operators (ISOs) or Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Figure 3 illustrates the locations of ISOs and RTOs 
across the U.S. The terms ISO and RTO are largely synonymous. These groups operate the 
transmission system and manage equitable competition amongst electricity providers in 
horizontally integrated markets where generation, transmission, distribution, and 
customers can be managed by separate entities. In contrast, other regions have vertically 
integrated markets where a single organization owns and operates assets across all across 
all network scales from generation to customer. These regions do not necessarily have RSO 
or RTO entities.84 Moreover, some vertically integrated power utilities also act as an ISO 
due to their large market region, such as PJM in the Eastern Interconnection.  
Both regions with and without ISOs and RTOs are comprised of a group of 
balancing authorities who ensure safe system operation. Typically, a large-scale electric 
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utility acts as a balancing authority to manage the balance between supply and demand of 
its assets and connected regions. This is done by ensuring that electrical demand does not 
exceed the supply of electricity to the grid and that generation dispatch is capable to reach 
customers through transmission and distribution networks without exceeding operational 
thresholds. When this balance is not correctly managed, blackouts can occur at various 
scales across the grid. When necessary, balancing authorities will conduct electricity 
transfers between each other to guarantee adequate supply.85 Some entities hold multiple 
roles with this operational structure. For example, ERCOT acts as its own interconnection, 
ISO, and balancing authority.86 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Electric Power Market ISOs and RTOs87 
B. SECURING THE ELECTRICAL SECTOR: ACTORS 
A wide variety of actors share responsibility for security of the U.S. electrical grid 
(Table 3). As the sector-specific agency for energy infrastructure, the Department of 
Energy (DOE) is the primary federal department responsible for electrical security matters. 
 
85 Hoff, “U.S. Electric System Is Made up of Interconnections and Balancing Authorities.” 
86 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Electric Power Markets.” 
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Although the DOE’s mission acknowledges that it will address energy challenges such as 
security, the department priorities are much more expansive than security matters. 
Reflecting this plethora of government priorities, security responsibilities are distributed 
across program offices within the DOE. The Office of Electricity (OE) and the Office of 
Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) are the primary 
players.88 The DOE also contributes to innovation efforts and broader energy policy 
initiatives.89 Program offices such as the Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy 
(EERE) and Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) are heavily involved 
in such efforts.90 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also engaged in 
electrical security, as DHS is involved in any issue that can be painted as a security matter. 
The recently established Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) would be 
a logical entity to address many of the issues that affect infrastructure security and, more 
specifically, electrical grid security.91 However, it appears that CISA will not be the lead 
for matters of electrical security. Instead, CISA will take the reigns as the sector-specific 
agency for critical infrastructure sectors that were previously assigned to DHS.92   
In addition to these two major players at the federal level, there are other federal 
organizations that contribute, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Additionally, 
state and local governments make important, although different contributions to providing 
electrical security. State governments do not typically support equivalent entities to the 
federal governments sprawling security apparatus, but instead they impact electrical 
security through a combination of legislation and regulatory initiatives.93 
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Although government entities are commonly portrayed as the sole actors engaged 
in electrical security efforts, private entities also have parts to play. In particular, electric 
utilities have a tremendous interest in protecting their assets. To accomplish this, utilities 
finance measures that will prevent the interruption of power. For example, following the 
2013 California substation attacks, the utility impacted invested several hundred million 
dollars to enhance security measures at numerous vital substations.94  
Table 3. Electrical Security Entities 
Entity Purpose & Scope 
DOE Primary federal department responsible for electrical 
security. Various program offices within the department 
are focused on security matters. 
DHS Primary federal department responsible for all internal 
national security matters. Not specifically focused on 
critical infrastructure or electrical security. Supports and 
collaborates on these security areas but is not the lead 
entity. 
CISA Primary federal agency responsible for security over 
several critical infrastructure sectors. Not directly 
responsible for electrical security but supports and 
collaborates. 
State & Local Entities Utilization varies by geographic area. Implements 
legislation and regulation to support electrical security. 
Electric Utilities Invests in security of assets to ensure provision of service 
and protect ability to earn profitable returns. 
 
C. SECURING THE ELECTRICAL SECTOR: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
POLICY INITIATIVES  
For more than two decades, the federal government has attempted to be the driving 
force behind enacting electrical security initiatives. There are several common 
characteristics within this line of effort. First, policy efforts for improving electrical 
security are often enacted within a more encompassing effort to improve overall critical 
infrastructure protection. Second, action has been taken almost explicitly by the executive 
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branch. Third, security policy has consistently pursued voluntary cooperation from private 
business. To demonstrate these common themes, I will provide a brief recap of recent 
noteworthy government policy initiatives.  
1. Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(PDD-63) 
The Clinton administration released PDD-63 in 1998, following the establishment 
and review of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.95 The 
presidential directive clearly recognized a growing concern about the interdependency of 
United States infrastructure systems, particularly with respect to the growth of utilizing 
cyber information systems across all sectors.96 This interdependency led efforts after PDD-
63 to encompass critical infrastructure as the overarching issue, even if vulnerabilities in 
specific sectors were truly the focus. 
Several aspects of PDD-63 would set the precedent for future action. The most 
significant is voluntary participation by the private sector. “In order to engage the private 
sector fully, it is preferred that participation by owners and operators in a national 
infrastructure protection system be voluntary.”97 The document also states that “private 
sector owners and operators should be encouraged to provide maximum feasible security 
for the infrastructure they control (emphasis added).”98 PDD-63 sought to persuade the 
private sector to participate by stating an intention to favor market solutions for 
infrastructure protection over regulation.99 This was likely included to assure the private 
sector that the federal government did not want to appear overly forceful in this endeavor. 
However, in contrast to voluntary participation, this preference was not explicitly stated in 
follow-on policies.  
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The government clearly recognized that vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure 
were a clear and present threat to national security interests. However, the use of 
terminology such as “voluntary” and “encouraged” in conjunction with a promise not to 
increase regulation seems to express a light-handed approach towards the government 
relationship with the private sector on this matter. Regardless, PDD-63 commenced an 
increased prioritization of securing critical infrastructure. 
2. Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity (E.O. 13636) 
E.O. 13636 was the first of several policy initiatives under the Obama 
administration that sought to address the continued concerns about critical infrastructure. 
As its title indicates, this executive order primarily sought to address cyber vulnerabilities 
that affect all critical infrastructure sectors. The primary proposal to address these concerns 
was through information sharing efforts between federal government intelligence and 
security focused agencies with businesses and their commercial security partners when 
applicable.100 However, the trend for voluntary cooperation is repeated throughout the 
order. The proposal for voluntary cooperation and participation is included in discussion 
of information sharing efforts as well as the development of a baseline set of cybersecurity 
standards. Additionally, the administration sought to discuss and develop incentives that 
would lure business entities to participate.101  
Aside from maintaining the theme of previous policy, there is an interesting portion 
of E.O. 13636 that addresses security responsibility. The document states that information 
will be shared with the private sector “so that these entities may better protect and defend 
themselves against cyber threats.”102 This raises an interesting line of thought. Obviously, 
businesses are entitled to protect their assets, but this makes it appear as though the federal 
government is pushing at least a portion of the responsibility for cyber security to the 
private sector. At best this can be perceived as a matter of necessary burden sharing across 
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the public-private divide. In contrast, it is easy to interpret this declaration as a matter of 
the federal government passing the buck to the private sector on a highly recognized 
security matter.  
3. Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (PPD-21)    
PPD-21 was released in February 2013, concurrently with E.O. 13636. While E.O. 
13636 sought to specifically address aspects of cyber security that impact critical 
infrastructure, PPD-21 was released to initiate a review of how the federal government 
approaches the security of critical infrastructure. As part of this review DHS was directed 
to evaluate the existing public-private partnership model. The directive does not 
specifically address the voluntary nature of the existing partnership. Rather it seeks to 
evaluate and consider possible improvements. Additionally, the directive ordered a review 
of the relationships within the federal government pertaining to critical infrastructure 
security and resilience.103 This would essentially clarify who was expected to be the point 
of contact within the federal government for coordination with owners and operators.   
It is also worth noting that PPD-21 directly acknowledges the energy sector. The 
directive describes how energy systems are distinctively important due to their 
interconnected operation with other sectors.104 This clearly underscores the importance of 
electrical security within the broader critical infrastructure protection strategy.  
4. National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013 (NIPP) 
The NIPP, released by DHS in 2013, is the national strategy intended to guide the 
security and resilience efforts across critical infrastructure sectors. The document 
acknowledges that it is “the government’s mandate to preserve public safety and ensure 
national security,” but that “coordination with infrastructure stakeholders is essential” to 
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do so.105 Despite this acknowledgement of government responsibility, the strategy 
perpetuates the dependence on cooperation through voluntary mechanisms. 
From the federal perspective, a large portion of this cooperation is expected to occur 
within the network of sector and cross sector councils. The two most notable groups within 
this structure are the Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and the Government 
Coordinating Councils (GCCs). SCCs are run and organized by representatives of private 
industry. Members interact on strategies and policies aimed to benefit their respective 
critical infrastructure sector. Additionally, the SCCs are meant to serve as the primary link 
of collaboration between the federal government and the private sector. The compliment 
to the SCC is the GCC. The GCC includes representatives from across government that 
have a stake in the operation and security of an infrastructure sector. Therefore, the GCC 
enables the necessary effort to coordinate across departments, jurisdictions, or even levels 
of government.106 Although the coordinating councils were established prior to the 2013 
NIPP, it underscores the importance that the federal government has placed upon them to 
facilitate cooperation with the private sector.  
5. Executive Order 13920: Securing the United States Bulk-Power 
System (E.O. 13920) 
E.O. 13920, issued in 2020, can be considered an outlier within this set of policy 
initiatives to an extent. It is the only policy that solely addresses electrical sector concerns. 
However, it does so with the clear intent of specifically protecting the bulk-power system 
as a major asset within critical infrastructure. It is also unique that it is not based on 
voluntary cooperation. On the contrary, this executive action is a mandate to those in the 
business of supplying electrical power to American citizens. Essentially this executive 
order prevents the acquisition of major electrical grid components from businesses based 
in adversarial nations.107 The LPTs discussed in Chapter II would be an example of the 
type of electrical equipment this executive order would prevent from being purchased 
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outside the U.S. This is the first broad critical infrastructure policy decision that explicitly 
restricts acquisition by the private sector, rather than rely on incentives or coordination. 
The structure of this policy implemented under the Trump administration is in contrast with 
past policy decisions under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. It is unclear 
whether the current Biden administration will resume seeking voluntary cooperation with 
the private sector. 
D. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR SECURING THE U.S. 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
The purpose of electrical public-private partnerships is to enhance grid security 
(Figure 4). The provision of electricity is considered a necessary and vital public service. Yet, 
the sector is largely maintained and operated by private businesses. Both types of actors 
recognize that they have a self-interest in ensuring the provision of electricity is reliable and 
secure. To achieve this, they must work together. This section will discuss three types of 
activities that contribute to the effectiveness of the public-private electrical security 
partnerships: information sharing, funding, and the ability to reform based on lessons learned. 
 










1. Information Sharing 
A plethora of federal policy documents emphasize the importance of information 
sharing across the public-private divide for ensuring electrical security. At a basic level, 
both sets of actors need to be on the same page and understand electrical security threats 
and vulnerabilities. There are multiple means by which public-private information sharing 
can take place.  
A general cycle for how information sharing occurs in diverse public-private 
partnerships is presented in Figure 5. I detail how this occurs in two key organizations 
identified in federal policy: the ESCC and the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (E-ISAC). Overall, the most prominent pathways for information sharing is through 
the coordinating council structure defined in federal policies like the NIPP described above. 
However, there appear to be several weak points with such a strong dependence on this 
relationship. The first is that the ESCC is voluntary and self-governed. Businesses’ 
participation is neither regulated nor mandated by any federal agency.108  
The ESCC is led and managed by private business executives with support from 
their respective staffs. Their official roster indicates 32 members participate in the 
coordinating council.109 Some of the executives represent larger organizations with 
smaller sub-entities. However, there is no explicit lower-level set of organizations or 
associations that must receive information. This means there is no guarantee that the 
information sharing, coordination, and progress facilitated by ESCC efforts will be passed 
on to the entirety of the electrical power industry. Furthermore, there are significant 
differences between the organizations that each executive represents. It is only natural for 
an executive to prioritize sharing information that has a higher probability to impact their 
own organization.  
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Beyond the voluntary nature of membership and limited scope of participation, the 
characteristics of the ESCC and its activities are difficult to assess. Other than a handful of 
generic public relations press releases, the ESCC does not appear to release any substantial 
amount of information to the public on its activities.110 Perhaps because of the limited 
amount of source material available, academics have largely not addressed the organization 
and its contributions. Without these analyses, it is difficult to assess the value of the ESCC 
as an information sharing asset within electrical security efforts. 
The E-ISAC is another important organization that facilitates information sharing 
across the public-private divide, but there are distinct differences between the two entities. 
E-ISAC contributes within the larger ISAC structure that supports critical infrastructure, 
comparable to the SCC structure. However, E-ISAC is a federal government construct and 
falls under the NERC. Additionally, membership and participation in the organization are 
geared towards high level security and intelligence specialists who work for electrical 
operators, rather than towards electrical company executives. These experts may be better 
qualified to understand technical information and analyses that are shared within the 
organization.  
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Figure 5. Electrical Security Information Cycle 
A substantial concern with both organizations is the quality of shared information. 
Private business stakeholders are naturally hesitant to share information about their systems 
or processes for fear of competitive exploitation and wish to maintain trade secrets as much 
as possible. To counter this disincentive for private entities to voluntarily cooperate and 
share information, the federal government created a new classification that provided 
restrictive limits for sharing. Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) limits 
information sharing between those trained, certified, or have a ‘need to know’. It even has 
exemptions from Freedom of Information Act requests.111 Consequently, the classification 
severely inhibits the ability to share information between organizational entities.   
The constraints created by PCII classification are acknowledged within the E-ISAC 
Strategic Plan. The document states that a long-term focus is to “enhance the E-ISAC’s 
capability to better leverage classified and other critical threat and intelligence information 
(both nonpublic governmental and private sector) to provide timely and actionable 
 
111 David L. Alderson, “Overcoming Barriers to Greater Scientific Understanding of Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience,” in Handbook on Resilience of Socio-Technical Systems (Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 71–72. 
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information to the sector regarding security risks.”112 The organization therefore 
acknowledges that security information could be shared more effectively. 
2. Funding 
Funding is a vital aspect of successful electrical security. It finances improved 
security measures and modernized infrastructure assets and assert the level of priority 
based on the scope of funding allotted. The plethora of funding mechanisms contribute to 
diverse electrical security goals such as research and risk reduction. 
One path for funding is the utilization to conduct research and development (R&D). 
Due to the nature of the threat, a large portion of electrical security R&D has focused on 
cyber security concerns through the DOE’s Cybersecurity of Energy Delivery Systems 
(CEDS) program. Research projects in the program are led by private industry, university, 
and national lab representatives who receive funding and collaborate with DOE personnel 
through the program.113 Since the CEDS program began in 2010, approximately $240 
million dollars has been invested into the research conducted with positive results. 35 
various tools and technologies developed through CEDS research are actively being 
utilized to strengthen the resilience of U.S. energy delivery systems.114 
Another funding avenue that will impact electrical security efforts is FEMA’s 
Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program. Since the passage of 
the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018, FEMA has been working to get the BRIC 
program up and running. The grant funding provided by the program aims to aid state and 
local governments in the pursuit of hazard mitigation projects that will reduce the risks that 
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applicant communities face from natural disasters and hazards.115 Although any attempt 
to mitigate risk should be viewed positively, the program remains in its infancy and its 
effectiveness it yet to be determined. From an electrical security perspective, the question 
should be what portion of this funding is going to impact electrical assets? The program is 
intended to address infrastructure in its entirety. Therefore, funding will be diluted across 
a wide swath of needed projects in applicant communities. If application data is any 
indication as to how funding will be allotted, the overwhelming majority will be granted to 
implement flood control measures over infrastructure protection.116 
Although the BRIC program is not demonstrative of a direct partnership between 
public and private entities, the trickle-down effects of the program justify its discussion. The 
BRIC program is reducing risk and hazards at the community level which should reduce 
required federal support in the future. Although funding is granted to local governments, the 
application process also produces further public-private cooperation as well as insight into local 
level priorities which can be representative of the utilities they host.  
3. Lessons Learned  
Effective public-private electrical partnership must be able to implement reforms 
based on lessons learned from past failures. The 2021 winter storm that disabled power 
throughout Texas provides an example of the obstacles to reform. The Texas power grid is 
not under federal jurisdiction which exempts it from federally mandated rules and 
safeguards.117 Therefore, the interactions within this public-private partnership are 
inherently different from those involving the federal government. Additionally, this event 
is relatively recent, meaning that analyses and various legislative inquiries into the event 
 
115 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities 
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remain ongoing. However, its severe impacts on the grid and population of Texas justifies 
its consideration for analysis. 
The 2021 winter storm was not the first to impact Texas on a massive scale. 
Comparable cold snaps previously struck Texas in 1899, 1951, 1983, 1989, and 2011.118 
Examining the period between 2011 and 2021 paints a bleak picture for public-private 
collaboration in implementing reforms based on lessons learned. Following the 2011 
storm, despite its limited jurisdiction, the FERC issued guidance to ERCOT, which 
manages most of the grid in Texas. The guidance focused primarily on the need to conduct 
weatherization efforts to strengthen the grid during future winter storms. However, this 
guidance was strictly voluntary.119 ERCOT and utility operators subsequently decided that 
the cost to conduct weatherization was unwarranted due to the perceived frequency with 
which severe winter weather events occur. As it turned out, the anticipated costs were 
dwarfed by the cost of the 2021 storm. The economic losses in Texas are estimated at 
approximately $130 billion. Additionally, 4.5 million households lost power and at least 
111 lives were lost.120 It is also worth noting that Texas cities not part of the ERCOT 
interconnection, such as El Paso and Beaumont, experienced little to no loss of power 
during the 2021 cold snap. These areas, which were subject to greater federal oversight, 
invested in winter preparations and drew upon power from other portions of the grid that 
were unstrained by the adverse weather.121  
The Texas case demonstrates that electrical security reforms are possible with 
appropriate cooperation between public and private partners. However, adaptations are limited 
by a reliance on voluntary cooperation. Private entities are less inclined to enact voluntary 
guidance when it is perceived to prevent a minimally frequent risk against their assets. 
 
118 James Doss-Gollin et al., “How Unprecedented Was the February 2021 Texas Cold Snap?,” 
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119 Joshua W. Busby et al., “Cascading Risks: Understanding the 2021 Winter Blackout in Texas,” 
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However, reform is not always cooperative. There are times when it may be necessary for 
public officials and regulatory agencies to forcefully enact regulation. For example, this may 
occur as information concerning electric power failures becomes highlighted following a 
system disruption or disaster.  
E. ASSESSMENT 
Figure 6 illustrates how the three types of public-private engagement discussed 
above can interact to successfully maintain U.S. electrical security by exercising an 
effective electrical security strategy. Information sharing and lessons learned often result 
in the implementation of regulation or ‘regulation-like’ standards that guide operations for 
utilities. Funding is frequently used to improve electric power systems. In combination 
with lessons learned, the result is a substantial increase in hazard prevention and reduction 
of risk to system operations. Research requires a substantial amount of information sharing 
and funding. These factors work together to produce advances in security oriented 
technology and innovation. However, the information presented in the previous sections 
indicates that there are at least two significant gaps in the current electrical security 
partnership structure. First, organizational structures and the responsibilities of entities 
involved are extremely diverse and convoluted. Second, the government’s dependence on 
voluntary cooperation by the private sector is highly problematic.  
 
Figure 6. Electrical Security Cooperation 
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Although operators seem to clearly understand where their operational boundaries 
lie, the complex structure makes it more difficult for government entities to provide 
security assistance. The variations across the operational structure weaken security efforts. 
While it is unrealistic to expect a cookie cutter approach to organizing the grid, more 
standardization could prove advantageous for security efforts. However, to create any 
degree of standardization, stakeholders must decide whether any operational structure is 
more advantageous than another. Is it better to have electricity supplied in a monopolized 
manner or have a dispersal of organizational responsibility? 
A wider distribution of operational participants can make coordination more 
difficult as it creates an increased number of entities that must be included within the 
planning, decision making, and enactment of policy. However, when issues arise it can be 
easier to delineate which entity holds responsibility based on which portion of the grid or 
location is affected. In contrast, it is always easy to assign responsibility in a monopolized 
structure because the singular entity controls all aspects of the operational structure. 
Unfortunately, when this organization makes mistakes, they tend to compound across the 
entirety of the structure which they control. This applies to the February 2021 power 
outages in Texas. When severe winter weather struck, generation sources went offline 
across the state and demand could not be met. This left millions of Texans to endure the 
relatively uncommon freezing temperatures without power to generate heat for their 
homes.122     
To be sure, while large scale losses such as the 2021 Texas outages or other events 
discussed in Chapter II have certainly happened, they do not occur frequently enough to 
suggest that public-private security partnerships persistently fail. There has not been a 
catastrophic loss of the U.S. power grid. However, the lack of standardization can make it 
difficult for federal security agencies to provide guidance or mandates for a complex set of 
entities overseeing operation of the grid.  
 
122 Russell Gold and Katherine Blunt, “Texas Power Outages to Drag Into Third Day as Deep Freeze 
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Additionally, while diverse, the operational structures present some challenges, the 
voluntary nature of the relationship between public and private entities is a greater concern. 
Recent security breaches in other critical infrastructure sectors should serve as a blinking 
red light to federal officials and operators alike. More must be done by the public and 
private sector to ensure that the U.S. power grid is protected from the wide range of 
malicious and natural threats that can prevent their operation. 
To begin with, the federal government needs to change course on its reliance on 
voluntary compliance by the private sector. At a certain point, the criticality of the service 
should outweigh voluntary participation. The impact upon the citizenry is too great to 
solely rely on the private sector to respond to voluntary guidance or requests. There are 
aspects of security that should be mandated and regulated to force businesses to meet an 
expected standard. This does not mean that any kind of security regulations should be 
issued unilaterally without the cooperation of private sector representatives. Private sector 
stakeholders, such as the E-ISAC and ESCC, should partake in the formulation of such 
mandates to provide expertise and acknowledge where shortcomings or vulnerabilities are 
likely to occur. Additionally, there may be instances where the private sector or not-for-
profit local utilities will need increased funding assistance to implement necessary security 
standards. Federal officials cannot forget that the highest priority for businesses is their 
bottom line. Security may be a factor in their calculations, but in the end, businesses are 
focused on profits. There will surely be advocates who oppose an increase in the regulation 
of businesses. However, with respect to electrical security and critical infrastructure 
protection in general, this should be accepted as the price of doing business in areas that 
directly affect the well-being and stability of the American people and its economy.  
Due to the wide array of threats against the electric grid, it may be helpful for public 
and private entities to consider specifying certain themes of threats that each should be 
primarily responsible for. As the number of threats and complex integration of systems has 
increased, one can see how security responsibilities have expanded to a point that the 
government cannot step in to take complete control. However, as the federal government 
maintains primary responsibility for security of its citizens, it should take the lead on any 
threat that is considered an attack. This would predominantly mean physical and cyber 
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attacks against the electrical grid. This plays into its traditional role of protecting the 
citizenry against malicious state and non-state actors that wish to harm national interests. 
Additionally, the federal government has the necessary intelligence apparatus to address 
these types of threats. As part of this delineation of responsibility, the federal government 
could take the lead on providing mandated security requirements and the majority of the 
necessary funding to implement required standards.  
Other threat areas such as natural disasters and aging infrastructure concerns should 
fall primarily within the scope of the private sector and not-for-profit utilities managing the 
grid. While these areas certainly fall within the parameters of electrical security, these 
threats are not malicious in nature and are to a degree more predictable. For the foreseeable 
future, severe weather will continue to disrupt the provision of power to some extent. 
Infrastructure will continue to age and need to be replaced to provide reliable service. 
However, these issues are within the means of the private sector and utility operators to 
address within their own risk analysis while receiving guidance and continued cooperation 
from federal agencies. When necessary, state and local governments can be the primary 
means of funding assistance for these issues as the impacts of these threats will most 
heavily impact their respective citizenry and local economy. An organization such as 
FEMA will still have a role in response efforts, but prevention efforts for these threat areas 
can be led by the private sector. These examples do not justify the dismal or removal of 
public-private partnerships to address these vulnerabilities. The increasing complexity and 
frequency of electrical security vulnerabilities suggests that a delineated leader within the 
partnership might strengthen efforts pursued.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The response of electricity operational and security structures has not been tested 
by a complete failure of the electrical grid. Even the large-scale outages that have occurred 
within the U.S. have been contained to respective regions and occurred over a limited span 
of time. Electrical organizational structures are particularly diverse and complex. These 
organizations on each side of the public-private divide have room for improvement with 
respect to information sharing, funding, and implementing lessons learned. Aside from the 
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organizational complexity of the electric grid and its supporting entities, there are other 
aspects of the public private partnership that should be updated. The voluntary cooperation 
of private entities is an outdated concept. A lack of security cooperation can create severe 
consequences for the American public if private entities fail to implement adequate 
protections. The federal government should consider implementing increased regulation to 
boost the security of the electrical grid rather than depending on voluntary cooperation. 
Businesses will have to accept this as the price of profiting from the provision of what is 
considered an essential service. Additionally, although cooperation should continue 
between public and private electrical entities to address electrical security concerns, 
consideration should be given to distinguish threat areas that public and private entities 
respectively should have primary responsibility over. Federal agencies can take the lead on 
attacks against electrical infrastructure, while private entities can take the lead on non-
malicious threats such as natural disasters and aging infrastructure concerns. 
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IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY SECURITY 
The federal government defines renewable energy as “electric energy generated 
from solar, wind, biomass, landfill gas, ocean (including tidal, wave, current, and thermal), 
geothermal, municipal solid waste, or new hydroelectric generation capacity achieved from 
increased efficiency or additions of new capacity at an existing hydroelectric project.”123  
Although they do not always mean the same thing, other terms such as clean or 
green energy are frequently used synonymously. Regardless of the terminology used, 
renewable energy is sourced from naturally replenishing resources. However, these 
resources are flow limited meaning they are restricted by the amount of energy that is 
available within a defined period.124 
The establishment of renewable energy is intrinsically linked to the growing 
concern and addressal of climate change and carbon emissions. The federal government 
began to address these concerns under the Obama administration with the Climate Action 
Plan. The first goal within this plan was to cut carbon emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 
2005 levels by 2025. Strategies to meet this goal relied heavily on the power sector to 
pursue renewable energy projects and energy efficiency.125 Despite progress beginning 
under the Obama administration, the Trump White House sought to weaken attempts to 
transition to renewable energy. In addition to removing the U.S. from the Paris Climate 
Agreement and directly supporting fossil fuel initiatives, the Trump administration 
hindered solar development by imposing tariffs on solar panels under the veil of broader 
trade hostilities with Asian countries.126 Since the Biden administration has taken office, 
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they have clearly outlined that the federal government will strongly support the pursuit of 
renewable energy across America’s electric grid. In comparison, many state governments 
began to take action to enact renewable energy legislation in the late 1990s continuing into 
the following decade. This legislation trend is referred to as renewable portfolio standards. 
Although standards vary within each state, they require that a percentage of electricity 
comes from renewable sources.127   
It is all but certain that the U.S. electric grid is going to transition towards being 
predominantly sourced from renewable energy. Largely due to the increasing impact of 
climate change, governments, businesses, and individuals have been driven to begin 
adopting renewable energy as a means to enact change. In January 2021, this transition was 
officially endorsed by the federal government via Executive Order 14008. This document 
called for the development of plans to achieve “a carbon pollution-free electricity sector 
no later than 2035.”128 Even if the federal government loses focus or shifts priorities, it 
appears that many states will continue to push the electrical sector towards renewable 
energy. This is demonstrated by the wide adoption of renewable portfolio standards by 
state legislatures across the country. 
Renewable energy generation is already being introduced into the U.S. electrical 
power mix at a variety of scales. In fact, as shown in Figure 7, renewable energy is now 
the second largest source of electricity in the U.S., producing 834 billion kilowatt hours 
(kWh) of electricity in 2020. The leading power generation source, natural gas, produces 
1,617 billion kWh annually. Many states, regions, businesses, and individual residences 
are reaping the security benefits of renewable energies like solar power. For example, the 
introduction of solar power for individual homes and businesses makes customers less 
susceptible to a loss of electricity, since each building essentially becomes its own grid 
network. 
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Figure 7. Annual U.S. Electricity Generation by Sector.129  
Further transition to renewable electricity assets will transform the physical and 
organizational makeup of the electric grid. This transformation will usher in additional 
security challenges to the ones already being managed and mitigated through the public-
private partnerships. This chapter will begin by comparing the threats to a conventional 
and a renewables-based energy grid. Next, it will assess the applicability of federal 
electrical security policy initiatives to renewable energy security. Lastly, it will examine 
how new renewable energy public-private partnerships are impacting the approach to 
renewable energy security. 
A. THREAT COMPARISON 
By and large, the threats to renewable energy appear to align with our 
understanding of the major threats to traditional electrical energy. The threat of physical 
attacks on renewable generation assets will largely mirror the threats associated with 
conventional energy assets, particularly the fact that many facilities will cover large areas 
of land where it is difficult to maintain adequate security oversight. While many renewable 
energy technologies can be deployed at a household or micro level, the majority of current 
and planned generation is deployed at grid-scale in large mono-purpose facilities. For 
 
129 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Renewables Became the Second-Most Prevalent 
U.S. Electricity Source in 2020,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 28, 2021, 
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example, many of the largest solar farms in the U.S. cover areas greater than ten square 
kilometers.130 Like the conventional installations described in Chapter II, these facilities 
are in isolated areas. This combination of geographic isolation and concentration of 
valuable energy assets within a relatively large area increases vulnerability. This logic for 
large scale solar farms can be applied to other renewable energy assets such as wind farms 
and various off shore systems.  
Cyber threats will also continue to be a major concern for electrical security as the 
grid transitions to increased incorporation of renewable power generation. In fact, 
renewable energy facilities in the U.S. have already become victims of cyber attack. In 
March 2019, unidentified actors launched a denial of service attack that compromised the 
monitoring of approximately 500 MW of wind and solar assets in California, Wyoming, 
and Utah. Luckily, there was no loss of generation from the attack.131 Regardless, this 
demonstrates the persistent threat and severe impacts that interconnected cyber systems 
and assets may have on electrical security.  
Renewable energy generation assets are not currently threatened by the age of their 
infrastructure, as they are just beginning to be introduced. However, these new generation 
sources continue to rely on old transmission networks, where most of the concern for aging 
electrical infrastructure exists. Reports claim that most of the transmission lines in the U.S. 
have surpassed their intended lifespan. Furthermore, these dated transmission lines were 
not designed to carry the amount of demand currently placed upon them.132  The 
incorporation of renewable energy sources and the potential introduction of more complex 
energy flow networks into the grid will intensify challenges to transmission infrastructure. 
In particular, distribution systems located in communities or at the household level can lead 
to voltage imbalances that impact the operation of legacy transmission and distribution 
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assets.133 One means of enhancing U.S. electrical security during the introduction of 
generation assets would be to conduct it in tandem with updating the nations electrical 
transmission infrastructure, thereby removing the risks associated with the continued 
operation of outdated systems.  
Although it will take time for large numbers of renewable energy assets to be 
concerned with their age, the concept of aging infrastructure will have a different dynamic 
with renewable energy. The average solar photovoltaic panel has an anticipated lifespan 
between twenty and thirty years.134 This is interesting because it is roughly half the 
lifespan of conventional electric assets. As solar panels have a shorter lifespan, 
consideration will need to be given to their replacement and the demand that places on the 
supply chain. Many renewable energy goals fall between the years 2035 and 2050. It is 
possible that just as many of these national level goals are achieved, assets will be due for 
renewal. 
Another new consideration for renewable energy security is the integration with 
cyber based devices connected to individual residences. With technology such as solar 
panels, a home essentially becomes its own power generation facility. However, as aspects 
of home energy control systems are connected via cyber networks, the susceptibility to 
cyber attack increases. When power is centralized, there is a more compelling incentive to 
ensure cyber security is maintained. In contrast, cyber assets at individual households are 
likely to not be nearly as secure. However, coordinated attacks against distributed electric 
resources and technologies that have a low barrier to entry are a probable scenario that 
could threaten security and create large scale impacts across the electric grid.  
The transition to renewable energy will usher a change in how power delivery is 
conceptualized. Although renewable energy assets will eventually dominate the electric grid, 
some degree of conventional electricity generation assets are likely to remain as backup 
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power sources. Many conventional fossil fuel assets provide stable baseload power. 
However, the fossil fuel that most likely to survive the renewable energy transition is natural 
gas as it has lower emissions. The problem is that many natural gas power plants are designed 
to deliver power for peak load periods and quickly ramping up supply. This demands new 
consideration for how this energy source is effectively utilized. Additionally, with continued 
reliance on natural gas, consideration must be given to pipeline vulnerabilities. The Texas 
cold snap is a perfect example of how a natural disaster can interrupt the delivery of natural 
gas resulting in cascading failures operating the electric grid.   
One aspect of renewable energy that will present new security challenges is the 
variability of renewable resources. For example, the sun isn’t always shining, and the wind 
isn’t always blowing. This weather variability threatens the uninterrupted provision of 
electrical power to Americans by straining the already precarious balance between 
generation and consumption. However, this variability is expected to be addressed by 
developments in energy storage technology that will drastically change the manner by 
which balancing the grid is conducted.135  
Although the introduction of storage technologies is a challenge, the use of 
improved storage technologies could simultaneously improve electrical security. In 
addition to managing the fluctuations within renewable energy power generation, storage 
technologies can provide backup power when outages occur. They can also potentially 
facilitate “black start recoveries,” which restore power during shutdowns of the national 
transmission system.136  
Although power will still be lost during weather events and natural disasters to 
some degree, cascading failures are preventable when individual building units have their 
own power generation and storage assets. Additionally, the cost-benefit calculation of 
attacking an individual building unit, provided it is not a major government building or 
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other high visibility target, will not align with the “shock and awe” desired by actors who 
target the electrical grid  
B. SECURING RENEWABLE ENERGY 
The federal government demonstrated its commitment to transitioning the 
generation structure of America’s electric grid in E.O. 14008. It appears that the most 
influential private entities and utility organizations are on board with this transition, 
particularly those who are involved in the current public-private partnership structure. 
Analysis of the ESCC roster demonstrates that nearly the entirety of its membership has 
recognized the importance of transitioning to the use of renewable generation sources 
within their portfolio.137 While some of this may be an exercise of public relations, the 
nearly unanimous recognition of renewables as well as the explicit decarbonization goals 
of some organizations makes it difficult to dismiss the predicted inclusion and expansion 
of renewables. This buy-in from the private sector has pros and cons. It is certainly positive 
that the public and private entities are of a shared mindset that the grid needs to transition 
to renewable energy sources. This should easily enable cooperative efforts within the 
partnership. However, the continued presence of the same organizations within the 
partnership structure will make it more difficult to implement structural change. An 
inability to exercise structural change means that the complex organization of the electrical 
sector is likely to persist.  
Just as the introduction of renewable generation remains in its infancy, the same 
can be said of renewable energy security. It is advantageous for electrical security experts 
that the deliberate threats on the grid conceptually align with those they are already 
attempting to address with protection of the conventional grid. Thus far, this has allowed 
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renewable security efforts to have a slightly different perspective that focuses more on the 
introduction and operation of a renewables-dominant grid, rather than explicitly shielding 
it from attack.  
1. Public and Private Unilateral Renewable Energy Security Efforts 
Chapter III discussed several of the federal government policy initiatives that aimed 
to drive security efforts within the electrical sector. Analysis of these policy measures 
demonstrated three consistent themes amongst these policy initiatives. First, electrical 
security efforts are often enacted within broader efforts to improve the security of all 
critical infrastructure. Second, the executive branch is typically the one who has taken or 
led actions to bolster electrical security. Third, policy initiatives have consistently pursued 
voluntary cooperation from private businesses to participate in the necessary security 
partnership.  
Further analysis of these policy initiatives shows that there is no explicit discussion 
of renewable energy in any of them. Over a span of more than twenty years, the federal 
government failed to factor in the security of renewable energy assets in any of its 
prominent electrical security policy initiatives. At best, these policies address issues that 
are common to renewable and conventional energy security such as cyber security and 
critical infrastructure interdependency.  
This suggests that many of the federal government policy initiatives aimed at 
conventional grid security may be insufficient to address new challenges associated with 
introduction of renewable energy generation. While some address issues that are 
simultaneously related to renewable energy security, the overwhelming focus for energy 
security remains on its application to the conventional grid. Thus far, it appears that the 
federal government is predominantly focused on the implementation of renewable energy 
rather than the security of these energy assets. This is demonstrated within the most 
important federal policy document to recognize renewable energy, E.O. 14008. This order 
never explicitly addresses energy security or renewable energy security. However, it 
repeatedly mentions the ‘transition to’, ‘shift to’, and ‘deployment of’ clean and renewable 
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energy. All discussion of security within E.O. 14008 is applied to the broader application 
of national security within the context of climate change and its implications.138 
There are three probable reasons that the government is focusing on implementation 
rather than security of renewable energy: the federal government’s commitment to the 
public-private security partnership model, the alignment of conventional and renewable 
electrical threats, and the inherent increase in electrical security that is expected to occur 
as a result of adding more diverse and decentralized power generation to the electrical 
system.  
First, the renewable energy security efforts that have been carried out by the federal 
government are public-private partnerships, but they pursue slightly different approaches. 
Several of these efforts will be discussed later in this chapter. The government is not 
seeking to seize control over electrical security efforts. Doing so would likely be ineffective 
and convey the wrong message to private electrical business entities. Even with the 
introduction of renewable energy, the U.S. government remains committed to ensuring 
electrical security is enacted by the public-private partnership model.  
Second, renewable energy threats appear to align with current conventional 
electricity threats. There is not an urge to create problems that do not exist. That does not 
mean new renewable energy threats will not emerge. Rather, the most significant threat to 
renewable energy assets appears to be the successful and consistent operation of such 
systems. As such, conventional electrical security responses will continue to be applicable 
in the federal government approach to renewable energy security and for the near future, 
additional efforts will be aimed at ensuring the operation and design of renewable energy 
systems continue to provide consistent uninterrupted power.  
Third, most experts believe that renewable energy will be inherently more secure 
compared to conventional electrical systems. Increased diversity of generation sources, 
increased geographic dispersion of generation assets, and the inclusion of energy storage 
are just a few reasons that electrical security is likely to improve with the implementation 
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of renewable energy systems.139 Although electrical disruption is likely to naturally 
decrease due to renewable energy, it would be troubling to believe that disruptions will no 
longer occur.  
Similar to the federal government, it appears that private utilities are focusing more 
on the implementation and operation of renewable energy, rather than the security of these 
new generation assets. As previously mentioned, utilities have broadly accepted the idea 
that the electrical grid is transitioning to being predominantly sourced by renewable 
generation assets. However, private utilities are not unilaterally pursuing efforts explicitly 
targeted at renewable energy security.  
2. Public-Private Renewable Energy Partnerships 
Although previous federal policies fail to incorporate security for renewable 
energy, there are some renewable energy security efforts taking shape. These efforts 
continue to utilize and leverage the strengths of the public-private partnership model. As 
previously discussed within the context of conventional grid security, these efforts 
primarily entail information sharing, funding, and reform initiatives. As in conventional 
energy PPPs, the federal government appears to be the lead actor in renewable energy 
security PPPs.  
a. Information Sharing 
Chapter III demonstrated how information sharing efforts for conventional 
electrical grid security relied heavily on the utilization of organizations such as ESCC and 
E-ISAC. While these organizations remain important, the growth of renewables is 
introducing a new perspective on information sharing. Previous efforts to share information 
across the public-private divide have sought to expose design vulnerabilities and strengthen 
the grid against possible deliberate attacks. New efforts are focusing more on analytics 
R&D to ensure that a renewables dominant grid can function and maintain operation. 
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As an example, the Hawaiian island of Maui is set to become one of the first 
interconnected electric transmission systems in the world that is completely supplied by 
renewable energy generation. Some estimates claim the island will achieve this goal as 
early as 2024.140 However, there is still substantial uncertainty about the variability and 
reliability of a renewables-reliant grid. To better understand and predict potential problems, 
the private electric utility on Maui, Hawaiian Electric, has partnered with the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), a national laboratory that focuses on renewable 
energy research for the DOE.  
The NREL is utilizing multi-timescale modeling tools to provide advanced systems 
analysis for Maui’s highly renewable-dependent electric system.141 Although Maui’s grid 
will operate with complete renewables generation for many hours each year, these models 
will help grid managers at Hawaiian Electric understand the parameters that will trigger 
the use of conventional electricity-generation sources to continue the uninterrupted 
provision of power. Furthermore, the modeling conducted by NREL is driving further 
exploration of grid stability options under renewable generation. Conventional electrical 
systems manage grid stability via the spinning generators that minimize electromagnetic 
disturbances. However, many prominent renewable generation assets, such as wind and 
solar, remove the ability to stabilize the grid in this manner. The NREL’s simulation-based 
modeling is exploring the use of synchronous condensers to stabilize renewable powered 
systems as an alternative.142 Increased information sharing via modeling initiatives 
appears to be a promising public-private pathways towards enhancing renewable energy 
security. 
The Maui example provides a single example of information sharing efforts. In 
particular, research and work conducted by the national lab system with an array of private 
partners produces data and results that are vital to the advancement of renewable energy 
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security. It is important to note that these efforts are advancing security in a less traditional 
manner. Typically, security oriented organizations, such as DHS, would have the greatest 
influence upon security issues. For renewable energy, it appears that federal entities that 
are more research minded, such as the national labs and DOE, are taking the lead to advance 
security efforts.  
b. Funding 
Of the three levers of the public-private partnership discussed in Chapter III, 
funding appears to be the most stable and effective means of facilitating cooperation 
between the federal government and private actors, to achieve electrical security. 
Numerous federal programs and offices, including CEDS, CESER, EERE, and national 
labs are poised to provide further, significant renewable security solutions via the funding 
they are distributing for collaborative research. For example, DOE recently announced two 
funding initiatives that will advance electrical security initiatives. The first initiative will 
provide $42.3 million of funding to support research that will usher clean energy 
innovation targeted at manufacturing processes. Specifically, the research aims to 
“improve the systems and processes for how energy is stored, converted, and used.”143 
The second initiative will provide technical assistance funding to five private 
manufacturing partners that will test clean energy technologies in industrial settings. Each 
private partner will receive $300,000 worth of funding.144 These examples are a minimal 
portion of the funding allocated to renewable energy programs. In 2020, renewable energy 
programs received in excess of $1 billion.145 However, it is difficult to ascertain how much 
of that funding went to partnership programs such as the two examples provided.  
The federal government is also undertaking funding initiatives to support private 
entities efforts to strengthen electrical infrastructure. Although these initiatives are not 
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specifically focused on renewable energy, strengthening the electrical grid will enhance 
renewable electrical security, as well as conventional electrical security. A significant 
portion of the proposed funding in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that is 
currently before Congress is targeted for the electrical sector. Although the details of the 
legislation continue to be debated, approximately $73 billion has been allocated to upgrade 
electric transmission lines and another $73 billion is allocated to assist the expansion of 
renewable energy sources.146 The approval of funding for these electrical line items in 
tandem is quite important. Without replacement and revitalization of transmission 
infrastructure, the widespread implementation of renewable electricity generation is 
putting the cart before the horse. Updating transmission infrastructure will support the 
implementation of more sophisticated renewable generation sources and complex energy 
sharing strategies. The bill does not offer much granularity on who these funds will be 
specifically distributed to. However, it is reasonable to assert that a significant amount of 
this funding will trickle down to utilities to enact the improvements and expansion that 
Congress has designated. As the bill navigates the American bureaucracy, it would be 
overly critical to highlight the current degree of specificity that the legislation has in its 
draft format. 
Further analysis of the funding proposals within the draft bill reinforces two 
concepts. First, with respect to explicit grid security concerns, the federal government has 
placed tremendous focus on cybersecurity. There is even a section that clearly delineates 
the importance of public-private partnerships to enhance grid security.147 Second, the 
aspects of the bill that discuss renewable energy are focused on implementation, not 
security.148 If this legislation ultimately passes, it will assuredly provide a tremendous 
shove from the federal government towards a transition of the electrical sector, needed 
infrastructure improvements, and further electrical innovation and research. However, it is 
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interesting that funding for security efforts is not as forward looking as it could be. With 
the existing assumption that the grid is transitioning to become dominated by renewable 
sources, increased funding should be allocated to focus explicitly on renewable energy 
security. 
c. Reform from Lessons Learned 
Because renewable energy is in its infancy, it is difficult to implement reform 
measures for PPPs based on lessons learned; there are simply few cases of renewable 
energy failure to draw upon. Generation from wind turbines were disrupted during the 
Texas cold snap.149 Some renewable energy pursuits, such as concentrated solar power 
facility Crescent Dunes, have been ineffective despite utilizing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in DOE loan guarantees.150 However, the cyber attack against renewable assets 
mentioned previously in this chapter provides the strongest opportunity to analyze a 
renewable energy security failure and identify lessons learned.  
Although the attack did not result in an inability to produce power, there are several 
other aspects that are just as important. First, the attack is believed to be the first 
cybersecurity incident to disrupt operation in the U.S. electrical sector.151 This reaffirms 
the belief that cybersecurity of the electrical grid is a legitimate threat to electrical security. 
Second, the attack targeted renewable energy assets. As the country continues to integrate 
renewable energy, this suggests that renewable energy sources will persistently be subject 
to cyber threats as the electrical grid transforms. Third, cyber security experts have 
expressed dismay over the simplicity with which the attack was conducted. The equipment 
targeted was accessible through the public internet.152 This allowed the intruder to 
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infiltrate the system via an unpatched firewall, even though the patch was available for 
implementation.153  
This raises several concerns regarding the design of the system, the preparedness 
of operators to prevent intrusion, and awareness of system managers. It is baffling that a 
network utilized for providing power would be accessible through the public internet. This 
appears to be a design flaw that is ripe for public-private cooperation to facilitate 
correction. Neither the federal government nor private business can afford the negative 
impact such a weakness presents.  
PPPs can improve the flaws experienced within information sharing and security 
standards. In this case, the shortfalls of information sharing were between private actors: 
the utility and the cyber security provider. However, common sense improvements can be 
implemented through regulation to serve as an enforcement mechanism and prevent future 
system intrusion. Such reform would require a variety of actors to collaborate. The federal 
government would need to lean heavily on CISA as the hub for cyber security 
developments across infrastructure sectors. The private sector should utilize the security 
expertise within the E-ISAC to seek adequate protection that makes sense for private 
actors. Of course, other entities such as DOE and the ESCC are assured to be involved, but 
most of the regulation development should be done by the security experts with eventual 
buy in from the business focused advisors. Regulation for cyber security will be 
complicated because the field is constantly evolving. Therefore, cyber and security experts 
should be placed at the center of the apparatus seeking to find a solution.  
In addition to the referenced cyber security incident, public and private actors can 
also extrapolate lessons learned from past mistakes with the conventional electric grid to 
provide a secure foundation for the use of larger amounts of renewable energy in the United 
States. Reform is a constant process that seeks to improve based upon the lessons learned 
in previous experiences and incidents. 
 




The electrical grid and its corresponding security environment are already 
tremendously complex. The increased use of renewable energy sources will create new and 
more complicated challenges for operators, policy makers, and security specialists. The 
federal government and private business actors appear to be more concerned with the 
implementation of renewable energy rather than the security of these new energy assets.  
Overall, it appears the threats against the electric grid will not be very different than 
today. Many of the same threats will continue to exist, but they will present new impacts 
to electrical security through the utilization of renewable energy assets. Events such as 
cyber attacks are likely to be distributed across many customers utilizing coordinated low 
barriers to entry, rather than centralized facilities.   
Although the comparison of threats against conventional and renewable energy is 
similar, the federal government has failed to account for the inclusion of renewable energy 
generation in electrical security policies. Despite any explicit mention of renewable energy 
security within public policy, public-private partnerships are forming. Although there are 
few examples of these efforts, cases such as the research and collaboration on Maui’s 
renewable electrical grid suggest that renewable public-private partnerships are enabling 
renewable energy security cooperation. Refinement of the mechanisms within public-
private partnerships, such as information sharing, funding, and reform, will continue to 





A. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
The cases discussed in Chapter IV demonstrate that the foundation of public-private 
renewable energy partnerships has already been laid. Information sharing and funding 
efforts are already being reimagined and revitalized to ensure the establishment of 
renewable energy assets and continued security of the grid. However, more can be done 
using the public-private partnership to enhance renewable energy security. Based on 
conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of various public-private partnerships, this 
chapter identifies recommendations for improvements in information sharing, funding, and 
reforms, which can be implemented as the grid transitions to strengthen renewable 
electrical security.  
1. Information Sharing 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the type of data analysis and information sharing 
conducted by NREL and Hawaiian Electric is a necessary advancement for information 
sharing efforts, particularly with regard to understanding renewable energy vulnerabilities. 
Although this is a positive example of information sharing, there are weak points of current 
information sharing organizations such as the ESCC and E-ISAC. The analysis in Chapter 
III revealed how voluntary membership hinders the capability of these organizations. A 
federal requirement for all electric utilities to participate in information sharing efforts 
should be the price of profiting from an essential service. Further participation and 
representation can be achieved through a more defined hierarchal structure to facilitate 
information flow.  
One example of how to do this might be to shift towards a model of state 
representatives within the ESCC and E-ISAC organizational structure. These 
representatives and their staffs would be responsible for facilitating information flow down 
to their respective state electric utility association as well as laterally to other state 
delegations. Although issues such as many utilities providing energy to multiple states still 
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remain to be resolved, a deliberately defined hierarchy with mandated membership could 
increase productive information sharing efforts, resulting in a more secure electrical grid.  
Another weak point of information sharing is PCII classification practices. E-ISAC 
should reassess the utility and administration of this classification. Trade secrets and 
security measures are not at odds with one another. E-ISAC, with participation from private 
company stakeholders, need to reform PCII classification to ensure that security relevant 
information can be shared. Any reform measures should be formulated without disregard 
for the concerns of private companies.  
Anticipated decentralized grid structures are going to share a tremendous amount 
of data. Private entities will have to come to terms with what is shared by the data and what 
organizations know about the technology that supports that data transfer. While making 
everything an ‘open book’ makes organizations vulnerable to hacking or corporate 
espionage, the environment with which information and data is shared and transmitted 
within the electrical sector has security and operational implications that will have to be 
considered moving forward. Adjustment of the PCII classification and information sharing 
in its entirety will be a balancing act. Too much unrestricted flow of information could 
invite cyber attacks and system intrusions as discussed in Chapter IV. If information 
sharing is inhibited, the ability to collaborate and share knowledge is severely impeded.   
2. Funding 
Eitan et al. identify six types of renewable energy partnerships between public and 
private actors, at the community level.154 One of these highlights how a private entity can 
assist the funding efforts of establishing community-level renewable energy projects. This 
is important considering the decentralized nature of renewable energy. Although this 
example accounts for funding flowing from private entities to local government, there is 
no reason to ignore the possibility of funding being provided by local governments, rather 
than the federal government, to assist private entities in the establishment of renewable 
energy projects in their community. Furthermore, although this literature focuses on the 
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establishment of renewable assets, the same funding schemes can be applied to the 
maintenance and upgrades of electrical security measures.   
3. Reform from Lessons Learned 
The primary focus area for reform should be the dependence on voluntary 
compliance. Whether it is applied to participation in information sharing or equipment 
security standards, asking companies to voluntarily comply is not enough. Voluntary 
recommendations have proven to be a hollow and inefficient mechanism to address 
security concerns. This is not to suggest that mandatory regulation should be excessively 
used as a blunt application for demanding government compliance. Rather with respect to 
electrical security, the relied upon preference towards voluntary implementation can have 
disastrous effects that are entirely preventable. When appropriately applied, regulation can 
be a tremendous means to strengthen the security of the grid. However, public and private 
stakeholders need to be equally involved in the formulation process.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. electrical grid is beginning to undertake a monumental shift in how it 
operates. This shift demands a reassessment of how electrical security will be ensured once 
the electrical grid operates primarily with renewable energy generation assets. This 
research focused on three areas: vulnerabilities and threats to electrical security, the public-
private electrical security partnership model, and how it can be used to enhance the security 
of renewable energy assets. 
The most prominent vulnerabilities of the U.S. electrical grid can be organized into 
two categories: first, the classic malicious security challenge carried out via a physical or 
cyber attack, and second, disruptions of electrical system operations by infrastructure and 
equipment malfunctions or natural weather events. Each category is a significant concern 
for present and future electrical security. Although these concerns are rational, based on 
their correlation to historical electrical outages, the scope by which electrical outages have 
occurred in the U.S. is relatively minimal. It is unrealistic to have a zero-defect mentality 
with respect to the electrical grid. However, the more that design and protocols are driven 
74 
to be resilient the more it will increase electrical security and minimize the disruption of 
electrical power.  
Public-private partnerships are recognized by the government and private 
businesses alike as a lynchpin of successful electrical security initiatives. Despite the 
diversity and complexity of organizations within this partnership structure, public and 
private entities leverage partnerships to cooperate. This is primarily observed through 
information sharing, funding, and reform from lessons learned. Each of these three tools 
have pros and cons that are open to critique, but they are all vital to the successful 
formulation and execution of an effective electrical security strategy. 
The transition to renewable energy assets is likely to continue leveraging public-
private partnerships for electrical security. Existing conventional vulnerabilities and threats 
will remain applicable and relevant to a renewable dominant energy grid. U.S. renewable 
generation facilities have already demonstrated that they are susceptible to intrusion from 
cyber attacks. However, thus far, it appears that there is an elevated focus on supporting 
the implementation and operation of renewable electricity over what are viewed as 
traditional electrical threats. The federal government is working to increase funding and 
expand collaborative information sharing to facilitate a secure transition to renewable 
energy generation assets. Although action is being taken to implement and strengthen 
renewable energy provision, there remains room for progress within the public-private 
partnership model.  
There are varied levels of academic analysis and government policy pertaining to 
the topics discussed within this thesis. Admittedly, this analysis often emphasized the 
perspective or shortfalls of the federal government within security efforts. Further research 
would benefit from diving deeper into the impacts of actions and programs carried out by 
the electric utilities. Additionally, a multidisciplinary approach to these issues could be 
advantageous. Many academic writings focus on the security, business, environmental, or 
public policy aspects of this issue, but electrical security is a multifaceted problem that 
requires the expertise of differing disciplines to ensure the continued provision of electrical 
power to the populace. 
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